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JOHN A. ROTHCHILD*
Economic Analysis of Technological
Protection Measures
T he use of technological protection measures (TPMs) by pub-
lishers' of information goods2 to prevent unauthorized use
of those goods3 is transforming the very nature of information
goods. Implementation of TPMs to protect information goods
has been greatly encouraged by the 1998 enactment of the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which added to federal
law a set of provisions making it illegal to traffic in technologies
that can be used to defeat TPMs and illegal to engage in certain
acts that circumvent TPMs. Congress enacted those provisions in
response to the entreaties of publishers, who insisted that they
would not make their products available in digital formats unless
they were provided with effective means of preventing unautho-
rized appropriations of their products' content. By responding as
it did, Congress accepted the proposition that copyrighted works
in digital formats are more at risk of infringing uses than are
* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. I gratefully acknowl-
edge the helpful comments received from Stephen Calkins, Michael Carroll, Peter
Hammer, Doug Lichtman, Jessica Litman, Peggy Radin, Omri Ben-Shahar, and stu-
dents in the Cyberlaw and Economics workshop at the University of Michigan Law
School. © 2005, John A. Rothchild
1 1 use the term "publisher" to refer to an entity that makes an information good
available to the public. The publisher is typically either the owner or a licensee of
the copyright to the material contained in the good.
2 1 use the term "information good" to refer to copyright-protected expression
that is fixed in some tangible medium. Although TPMs are most commonly applied
to information goods stored in digital formats, they may also be used to control
access to content stored in analog formats. The scrambling of cable television trans-
missions is an example of the latter. Several provisions of federal law prohibit the
circumvention of TPMs protecting analog information goods. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(k)(1) (2000) (prohibiting manufacture or sale of video cassette recorders that
lack prescribed copy control technology); 47 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2000) (prohibiting in-
terception of cable television broadcasts or provision of equipment for this purpose).
3 For example, a publisher might use a TPM to prevent a music CD from being
copied or to disallow a particular copy of a computer program from being installed
on more than one computer.
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those in analog formats, given the ease with which multiple gen-
erations of perfect copies may be made and distributed via digital
networks. In theory, TPMs secure copyrighted digital works
against infringing uses. In practice, however, any technological
protection can be, and usually has been, defeated by the applica-
tion of sufficient ingenuity. The DMCA's anticircumvention
rules are designed to discourage the ingenious from exercising
their skills in this particular domain by the threat of civil, and in
some circumstances criminal, liability.
While publishers responded to the anticircumvention rules
with jubilation, critics focused attention on the rules' less benevo-
lent aspects. The use of TPMs, backed up by the legal sanctions
of the anticircumvention rules, has effects that extend well be-
yond the securing of digital content against infringing uses.
These measures also limit or eliminate many uses that the copy-
right laws otherwise permit, such as fair use, use beyond expira-
tion of the copyright, use of ideas that are unprotected by
copyright, sales of copies on the secondary market, lending a
copy to a friend, lending by libraries, noncommercial copying of
music, nonpublic performance and display, and accessing a work
using an unapproved device. Uses whose legal validity is yet un-
resolved, such as copying for personal archival purposes, are also
limited by TPMs. Widespread deployment of these measures
could lead to the unattractive prospect of what some call a "pay-
per-use" society, in which every access, use, or transfer of an in-
formation good lies within the publisher's control and requires
payment of a fee.
But the fact that technology-plus-law permits such a state of
affairs to develop does not necessarily mean that it will develop.
Publishers are not required to deploy TPMs; they do so as a
means of promoting their economic interests. Like all economic
actors, publishers are subject to the discipline of the market. A
seller cannot sell goods that buyers decline to buy. Thus, opti-
mists have voiced the view that the pay-per-use society is nothing
to fear; if it is as obnoxious as it is made out to be, it will never
come into existence. If consumers dislike information goods that
are locked up with TPMs, those goods will languish on the
shelves. Publishers, who are in business to make money, not to
make a point, will get the message soon enough and will stop
producing goods that they are unable to sell. TPMs will go the
way of countless other failed consumer products that met and
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were defeated by the harsh realities of the marketplace. This
view has been enunciated by various commentators,4 including a
prominent Clinton Administration official during congressional
consideration of the proposed DMCA.5 Other commentators
have expressed doubts about whether the voice of the consumer
can tame what they perceive as the TPM monster.
6
4 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC
GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 98 (1999) (explaining to entrepreneurs that use
of TPMs may increase their sales but require them to lower prices, possibly reducing
profits); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Man-
agement on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 591 (1998) ("Absent
proof of a very narrow category of circumstances, such as duress or misrepresenta-
tion, we can assume that contracts under fared use reflect the interests of those who
choose to enter into them."); Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property
Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 115, 127 (1997) ("The low transaction costs in this market make search
and negotiation quite easy, which means an alternative source for a given piece of
content will almost always exist, thus reducing the chance that a party will have to
accept onerous terms."); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 740 (2000) (stating that "market fac-
tors" may prevent the pay-per-use world from coming to be); Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regu-
lations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 566 (1999) ("If one infor-
mation provider tightly locks up his content, a competing provider may see a
business opportunity in supplying a less tightly restricted copy to customers who
might otherwise buy from the first provider."); Ida Shum, Note, Getting "Ripped"
Off by Copy-Protected CDs, 29 J. LEGIS. 125, 153 (2002) ("Record labels hesitate to
move to a more secure format for digital music because of backlash from the pub-
lic."); Pete Singer, Comment, Mounting a Fair Use Defense to the Anti-Circumven-
tion Provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 111,
139 (2002) ("[U]sers could boycott certain copyright owners with rigid access control
measures in favor of copyright owners whose access control measures are less rigid
and designed to permit fair uses."); Lucas Graves, Has TiVO Forsaken Us?, WIRED,
Nov. 2004, at 150, at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.11/view.html?pg=3 ("If
[consumers] don't like a narrower window in which to view programming, they
won't purchase it. That'll send a message to the content owners.").
5 See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liabil-
ity Limitation Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280, 105th Cong. 54
(1997) [hereinafter WIPO Treaties Hearings] ("I do not believe that you need to do
anything at this moment with regard to fair use.... We have no reason to believe
that it will not apply fully, and I believe that the marketplace will take that into
consideration.") (testimony of Bruce Lehman).
6 See James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimi-
nation and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2033 (2000) (dis-
cussing the difficulty facing a consumer who is attempting to decide rationally
whether to buy an information good, since "to know what it is worth to you, you
would need to know what it is, but if you know what it is, then you no longer need to
purchase"); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy
of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 521 (1998) ("There is ... insuffi-
cient information from which to conclude that, in a mature market, vendors of sub-
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To assess whether it is reasonable to expect that market forces
will discipline publishers in their use of TPMs, thereby prevent-
ing the development of constraints on the use of information
goods that the community of users does not desire, we need to
understand both the factors that are relevant to a rational pub-
lisher's decision whether it should implement TPMs in its prod-
ucts and the empirical conditions on which these factors depend.
I approach this task by developing an economic model of pub-
lisher decision making with respect to TPMs. This model, while
situated within the neoclassical economic framework, differs
from the standard approaches to modeling producers' decision
making with respect to price and quantity. As I explain below, a
customized model is required because implementation of TPMs
cannot realistically be modeled either as a price increase or as a
product characteristic that consumers dislike.
This new model provides several insights. It disaggregates the
empirical conditions that affect a publisher's decision whether to
implement TPMs to control uses of its information goods, illumi-
nating the impact of several factors that a more traditional model
conflates or ignores. Disaggregating these factors enables us to
understand how considerations such as the undesirable side ef-
fects of a particular TPM implementation or its resistance to cir-
cumvention are factored into the publisher's decision. The
model also recognizes that TPM implementation is not a binary,
all-or-nothing proposition: there are different types of TPMs
(some of which can be used in combination), yielding a range of
possibilities that have varying implications for the publisher's
bottom line.
Part I of this Article describes the most common forms of
TPMs in current use. Part II sets out the history and operation of
the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions. Part III explicates
the double-edged nature of legally-backed TPMs: while TPMs
stitutable products will compete to offer less restrictive access terms."); Alfred C.
Yen, What Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the DMCA's Anti-Trafficking
Provisions, 2003 Wis. L. Rav. 649, 695 ("[T]here is a significant risk that copyright
holders will charge consumers an inappropriately high price for permission to exer-
cise their rights of fair use and access to copyrighted works."); Chad Woodford,
Comment, Trusted Computing or Big Brother? Putting the Rights Back in Digital
Rights Management, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 253, 255 (2004) ("Ultimately, it remains to
be seen whether consumers will understand these subtle and potentially devastating
technological changes and, more importantly, whether they will take a stand against
them. Furthermore, it is unclear what manufacturers and other industry players will
do if consumers do object.").
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offer the benefit of providing copyright owners with a tool that
enables them to vindicate their rights under the Copyright Act,
this benefit comes at the cost of contracting the public domain,
reducing access to information goods, inhibiting competition, and
invading privacy.
Part IV develops an economic model that reflects some unu-
sual features in the response of consumers to TPMs and in the
costs that TPMs entail for publishers who decide to implement
them. The publisher's decision whether to implement TPMs is
shown to depend on a combination of three factors: two that
have offsetting effects on consumer demand, and a cost factor.
Part V demonstrates how the model applies to a range of market
structures-pure competition, monopolistic competition, monop-
oly, and oligopoly-for several types of information goods.
Part VI sets out several historical examples of the application
of TPMs to information goods and derives from those examples a
set of empirical conditions that determine how consumer de-
mand and publisher costs are affected by the implementation of
TPMs.
I
VARIETIES OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION MEASURES
The technological protection measures addressed in this Arti-
cle are systems that control access to or use of information goods.
The most widely used TPMs are generally software-based7 and
rely on encryption together with some sort of authorization code
that permits decryption.8 The efficacy of widely used TPMs de-
rives from the fact that information goods in digital formats can-
not be usefully employed without some intermediary appliance,
such as a computer, DVD player, or CD player, that translates
the binary code constituting the stored work into text, sounds,
7 Hardware-based TPMs are less common than software-based TPMs. There are
devices called "dongles," also known as "hardware keys," which must be attached
physically to a computer in order for the associated software to function. For exam-
ple, in the mid-1990s, a CD version of the Encyclopaedia Britannica came with a
dongle. See Seth Hamblin, An A-to-Z Source Puts Its Hopes on CD, WASH. POST,
Dec. 31, 1997, at D10. It has been a while since dongles were in vogue. See John
Gilroy, Ask the Computer Guy, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1994, at F22 ("[M]ostly the
antipiracy dongle has gone the way of dinosaurs"). The copy protection device dis-
cussed in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988), an anti-
copy floppy diskette, was a hardware/software hybrid.
8 For a discussion of the technologies underlying TPMs, see Kenneth W. Dam,
Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 398-401 (1999).
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graphics, or other modes of communication that humans can
readily understand. Copyright-protected materials that are usa-
ble by humans without some intermediary device might in princi-
ple be protected by TPMs-for example, access to a hard-copy
book could be restricted by the application of a TPM consisting
of a wrapper secured by a padlock-but TPMs of this sort are
not presently of much practical significance.9
Several varieties of TPMs are in common use, while others are
in various stages of conception or development. First, and per-
haps most common, are TPMs that prevent the user from making
an unauthorized copy' of the information contained on a CD-
ROM, DVD, floppy diskette, digital audio tape cassette, or any
other material object holding a digital representation of text,
computer source code, music, movies, or other copyrighted mate-
rial. Examples of this type of TPM include the Content Scramble
System, which is used to encode most commercially released
movies on DVD and is licensed under conditions that require
manufacturers of playback devices to prevent users from copying
the material;" the Copy Switch, which is used in connection with
streaming audio or video in RealNetworks' format;' 2 and the Se-
rial Copy Management System, which prevents multiple-genera-
tion copying of recordings on digital audio tape.' 3
9 A frequently invoked metaphor characterizes evading a TPM as "the electronic
equivalent of breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a copy of a book."
H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17 (1998). See also WIPO Treaties Hearings, supra
note 5, at 49 ("Under existing law, it is not permissible to break into a locked room
in order to make fair use of a manuscript kept inside.") (prepared statement of
Marybeth Peters). The metaphor is inapt. Among other things, circumvention in-
volves no physical trespass. See Charles Fried, Perfect Freedom or Perfect Control?,
114 HARV. L. REV. 606, 629 n.50 (2000) (book review).
10 1 use the term "unauthorized" to refer to conduct by consumers that the pub-
lisher would like to prevent. Not all unauthorized use is infringing use. A publisher
might like to prevent consumers from making fair use of its product, publishing a
critical review, reselling it on the secondary market, or lending a copy to a friend-
none of which conflicts with the publisher's copyright.
11 See 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085,
1096 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d
294, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affid sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273
F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
12 See RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311,
*2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
13 See 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000) (requiring certain digital recording devices to be
equipped with the "Serial Copy Management System"). This requirement applies to
a rather narrow range of devices, excluding those devices which are currently of the
greatest significance to copyright owners and publishers. See Recording Indus.
Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (hold-
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Second, there are "tethering" systems that limit the number of
devices with which a particular copy can be used. For example,
within the past few years, software publishers have begun pro-
tecting some of their products with an "activation" requirement.
The software will not function until activated, which typically in-
volves a communication between the user's computer and the
publisher's server that results in a unique code number being re-
corded on the user's computer. After activation, the software
will not function on any other computer unless the publisher
grants permission upon special request. Some suppliers of music
files in MP3 format use a tethering system that prevents the file
from being played back on more than a designated number of
playback devices. A similar system is used in connection with
some electronic books.14 The Content Scramble System (CSS)
includes a feature called "region coding," which divides the
world into seven regions and prevents a DVD designated for
players made for one region from being played on a player made
for another region. Some electronic gaming systems also feature
region coding."5
Third, there are systems that limit how an information good
may be used. For example, the Adobe Acrobat Reader software
honors settings in a PDF document that control whether the doc-
ument may be printed, modified, or combined with other docu-
ments. The DVD-Video standard enables a DVD publisher to
prevent the viewer from engaging in certain actions, such as fast-
forwarding through commercials, by inserting User Operation
Prohibition (UOP) codes on the disc.' 6
Fourth, there are TPMs that control the transmission of con-
tent from one device to another. The proposed "broadcast flag"
implements such a system. In 2003, the Federal Communications
ing that computer hard drives and portable MP3 players are not covered). Record
labels are experimenting with new technology called "sterile burning," which simi-
larly allows a copy to be made of a CD but prevents copying of the copies. See
BMG Cracks Piracy Whip, WIRED, May 31, 2005, at http://www.wired.com/news/
digiwood/0,1412,67696,00.html.
14 See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1117-19 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(describing the Adobe Acrobat eBook Reader tethering system).
15 See Sony Computer Entm't Am. Inc. v. GameMasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981
(N.D. Cal. 1999).
16 See Connections-UOPs & Settings (User Operation Prohibitions), http://
www.mediachance.com/dvdlab/Helppro/cnt-uops.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2005);
MSDN, The DVD Standard, http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/
library/en-us/wcedvd/html/_wcesdkdxdvd the dvd standard.asp (last visited Nov.
5, 2005).
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Commission (FCC) issued regulations mandating that all devices
capable of receiving digital television broadcasts that are manu-
factured starting July 1, 2005 incorporate a system that recog-
nizes the presence of a series of bits embedded in a broadcast
indicating that the broadcaster has designated the material for
controlled redistribution.17 The FCC's regulations require that
these devices be designed to honor the broadcaster's insertion of
the indicator bits by preventing redistribution of the material to
unapproved devices."8 In 2005, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit invalidated the regula-
tions on the ground that the FCC had exceeded its delegated
authority in promulgating them. 9 At this writing, the broadcast
industry is engaged in efforts to revive the regulations by seeking
broadened FCC authority from Congress.2"
On the horizon are efforts to develop "trusted computing" sys-
tems, which will control all computer operations in order to pre-
vent a range of unauthorized actions. Microsoft is in the process
of developing such a system, which was originally referred to as
"Palladium" and, more recently, as the "Next-Generation Secure
Computing Base." This system is associated with the promised
next version of Windows, which is named "Windows Vista."2
II
THE ANTICIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS OF THE DMCA
In 1998, Congress enacted a set of provisions designed to in-
crease the efficacy of TPMs. 22 The weakness of TPMs, from the
17 In re Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003).
18 Id. app. B (proposed 47 C.F.R. § 73.9000-.9009). The broadcast flag system
also incorporates a form of access control, limiting the types of devices on which a
recorded program may be viewed, as well as a copy control, defining whether and
how many times a program may be copied. See CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND
TECHNOLOGY, IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROADCAST FLAG: A PUBLIC INTEREST PRI-
MER (VERSION 2.0) (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.cdt.org/copyright/broadcast
flag.pdf.
19 Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
20 See Eric A. Taub, After Ruling, Broadcasters May Seek Congress's Help in
HDTV Anti-Piracy Effort, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2005, at C2.
21 See Woodford, supra note 6, at 279-83; Microsoft, Next-Generation Secure
Computing Base, http://www.microsoft.com/resources/ngscb/default.mspx (last vis-
ited Nov. 5, 2005). The next generation of Windows was originally codenamed
"Longhorn," but has since been named "Windows Vista." See id.; Microsoft, Win-
dows Vista, http://www.microsoft.comlwindowsvista/default.mspx (last visited Nov.
5, 2005).
22 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (adding Chapter 12 to Title 17 of the U.S. Code).
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standpoint of the publishers that deploy them, is that they are
subject to circumvention. Some well-known examples of circum-
vention include the RAMKEY code, which defeats the
PROLOK floppy diskette anti-copy system;23 the DeCSS code,
which defeats the CSS protection of DVDs;2 4 and the Streambox
technology, which defeats RealNetworks' Secret Handshake and
Copy Switch." Software that defeats a TPM can be quickly,
cheaply, and widely distributed via the Internet, with the result
that when one person devises a circumvention technology, all ap-
plications of the TPM worldwide are potentially compromised.
Prior to the enactment of the DMCA, some publishers expressed
an unwillingness to release their products in digital formats un-
less TPMs could be secured against circumvention.26 Unautho-
rized copying of digital information goods is of particular
concern to publishers since, unlike information goods in analog
formats, digital goods can be copied through multiple genera-
tions with no degradation in quality and can be distributed nearly
costlessly via digital networks.
Rules banning devices designed to circumvent TPMs were pro-
posed in a 1995 report issued by the Clinton Administration's
Information Infrastructure Task Force.27 When Congress did not
adopt the Task Force's proposal, the U.S. delegation to the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) introduced a similar
proposal in the context of negotiations to develop what ulti-
mately became two 1996 treaties that updated the international
copyright legal regime.28 WIPO adopted a watered-down ver-
23 See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
24 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001).
25 See RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
26 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 304 ("Proponents of strong restrictions on
circumvention of access control measures argued that they were essential if copy-
right holders were to make their works available in digital form because digital
works otherwise could be pirated too easily."); Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair
Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 47-48
& n.20 (2001).
27 INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) (hereinafter INFO. INSTRAC-
TURE TASK FORCE), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/
ipnii.pdf.
28 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17 (1997),
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/index.html; WIPO Performances
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sion of the U.S. proposal in the form of a provision in each treaty
requiring signatory states to "provide adequate legal protection
and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effec-
tive technological measures" used to protect copyrighted
works.2 9 Congress then enacted the DMCA's anticircumvention
provisions for the stated purpose of implementing these treaty
provisions.3 °
The anticircumvention provisions principally prohibit three
types of conduct. First, it is forbidden to "circumvent a techno-
logical measure that effectively controls access to a work pro-
tected" under the copyright laws.31 Second, it is forbidden to
traffic in any technology that can be used to circumvent such ac-
cess controls if the technology is "primarily designed" for that
purpose, has no significant commercial purpose other than to fa-
cilitate circumvention, or is marketed as a circumvention de-
vice.32 Third, it is forbidden to traffic in a technology that can be
used for "circumventing protection afforded by a technological
measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner"
under the copyright laws, if any of the circumstances applying to
access-circumvention devices is present.33
The difference between the second and third prohibitions is
difficult to discern from the face of the statute. 34 The second re-
fers to devices that permit unauthorized access, while the third
refers to devices that enable unauthorized exercise of any of the
copyright owner's exclusive rights, such as copying.
The provisions thus ban trafficking in both devices that circum-
vent access controls and devices that circumvent use controls.
But this symmetrical approach does not extend to the act of us-
ing such devices to circumvent TPMs: while the act of circum-
venting an access control is forbidden, the act of circumventing a
and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), available
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/index.html.
29 WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 28, art. 11; WIPO Performances and Pho-
nograms Treaty, supra note 28, art. 18.
30 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998). For the history of these provisions, see Pamela
Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 409-15 (1997).
The wording of the DMCA's provisions is closer to that of the IITF report's propo-
sal and to that of the U.S. delegation's proposal to WIPO than it is to the final treaty
language.
3117 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
32 Id. § 1201(a)(2).
33 1d. § 1201(b)(1).
34 See David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots
of the DMCA's Commentary, 23 CARDoZO L. REV. 909, 947-49 (2002).
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use control is not. The justification for this is simple; the ramifi-
cations, though, are a bit more subtle. There is no need to ban
the act of circumventing a use control because such an act is al-
ready forbidden by the Copyright Act as an unauthorized exer-
cise of one of the copyright owner's exclusive rights, and
Congress did not wish to modify the grounds of such liability.35
The three types of conduct that section 1201 does ban (trafficking
in devices that circumvent access controls, trafficking in devices
that circumvent use controls, and the act of circumventing an ac-
cess control) do not constitute infringement under the Copyright
Act-hence the need for these new prohibitions.
Because the act of circumventing a use control violates only
the Copyright Act (and not the anticircumvention provisions),
such an act is no violation if it lies within one of the exceptions to
infringement liability contained within the Copyright Act.36 The
three broadest and most important exceptions are the privilege
of fair use,3 7 the exclusion of protection for ideas (as opposed to
expression),38 and the first-sale doctrine.39 One who is author-
ized to access a work protected by a TPM is therefore free to
circumvent a use control for the purpose of engaging in fair use
or in any other conduct permitted by the Copyright Act. As a
practical matter, however, most people will be unable to exercise
this right since it is probably unlawful for anyone to supply the
technology necessary to circumvent the control.4 °
35 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 12.
36 Section 106 sets out the exclusive rights of a copyright owner, but it explicitly
makes them "[s]ubject to sections 107 through 122" of the Act. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106
(2005).
37 Id. § 107.
38 Id. § 102(b).
39 Id. § 109(a) (limiting the distribution right); id. § 109(c) (limiting the display
right). Other limitations on the exclusive rights include privileges for libraries, id.
§ 108; exemption of certain performances and displays, id. § 110; exemptions and
statutory licenses for certain digital transmissions of sound recordings, id. § 114(d),
(f); compulsory licensing of mechanical reproductions of musical works, id. § 115;
and copying computer programs for use and backup, id. § 117. Section 108, added
in 1992 by the Audio Home Recording Act, is also a limitation on the section 106
rights, providing that the making of certain types of musical recordings is not action-
able as infringement under section 106.
40 See Nimmer, supra note 4, at 739-40 ("If the courts apply section 1201 as writ-
ten, the only users whose interests are truly safeguarded are those few who person-
ally possess sufficient expertise to counteract whatever technological measures are
placed in their path."); R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights
Controls Undermine the Structure of Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 619, 630-33 (2003) (discussing whether section 1201 bans trafficking in a use-
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However, fair use and the Copyright Act's other limitations on
the exclusive rights are not available to justify an act of circum-
venting an access control. As one court explained,41 Congress
chose to balance the interests of copyright owners and users with
respect to the anticircumvention rules not by importing the limi-
tations on infringement liability from the Copyright Act but by
crafting a set of exceptions to section 1201 liability for circum-
venting access controls4" and by providing a mechanism by which
the Librarian of Congress may create additional exceptions
through triennial rulemaking proceedings.43
Since access controls thus enjoy greater protection under sec-
tion 1201 than do use controls, it is natural to expect that publish-
ers that use TPMs and want to exercise maximum control will
always include an access control even if they are concerned only
with preventing infringing uses.4 4 By doing so, they render un-
available to users the fair use privilege and all other limitations
on the exclusive rights contained in the Copyright Act.
III
THE DETRIMENTS OF LEGALLY BACKED TPMs
TPMs, and the legal sanctions of section 1201 that support
them, are designed to give publishers increased control over ac-
control circumvention technology that is designed to allow consumers to engage in
uses permitted under the Copyright Act).
41 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322-24
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429
(2d Cir. 2001).
42 The exceptions include a shopping privilege for libraries, the right to reverse
engineer a computer program to determine how to construct a program that will
interoperate with it, permission to engage in limited types of encryption research,
and permission to disable privacy-invading technologies. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d), (f),
(g), (i) (2000).
43 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E). The two rulemakings that have been conducted so far
have exempted very narrow classes of works. See Exemption to Prohibition on Cir-
cumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 68
Fed. Reg. 62,011, 62,013-14 (Copyright Office, Oct. 31, 2003) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
§ 201.40) (exempting lists of sites blocked by filtering software, computer programs
protected by broken dongles, programs in obsolete formats, and e-books with the
read-aloud function disabled); Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copy-
right Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556,
64562 (Copyright Office, Oct. 27, 2000) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.40) (exempting
only two categories of works). The exemption allows circumvention of access con-
trols for noninfringing uses only.
44 See Reese, supra note 40, at 640-41 (suggesting that publishers will have an
incentive to employ "merged" access and copy controls).
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cess to and use of their products. Policymakers hope that the
availability of these tools will encourage publishers to release
their products in digital formats. Should we be concerned about
the possibility that publishers may overuse these technologies?
This Part discusses four detrimental effects that result from
publishers' use of TPMs: contraction of the public domain, con-
stricted access to digital information goods, harm to competition,
and invasion of privacy. The existence of these detriments means
that expanded use of TPMs is not an unalloyed benefit to society.
A. Contraction of the Public Domain
A copyrighted work is in the public domain to the extent that
it may be used freely by others without any need to obtain au-
thorization from the copyright owner.45 One element that goes
into the construction of the public domain is the set of limitations
on the copyright owner's exclusive rights that are built into the
Copyright Act. These limitations allow one to make a variety of
public and private uses of a copyrighted work with no need to
obtain permission from the copyright owner.4 6
The availability of TPMs, augmented by the section 1201 pro-
hibition on circumventing (or supplying the means of circum-
venting) such controls, enables publishers to remove some of
these uses from the public domain. A TPM that prevents copy-
ing the contents of a music CD onto a cassette tape may make it
impossible to play a song in a classroom equipped only with a
45 This use of the term "public domain" is broader than the definition one might
find in the dictionary. According to the dictionary definition, the public domain
consists of works that are free of any control by a copyright owner, such as works
whose term of copyright protection has expired and those that never qualified for
copyright protection in the first place. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965, 975 (1990) (referring to a dictionary definition). I use the term in a
broader sense, extending it to particular uses of a work that are unconstrained by
copyright even if other uses are within the copyright owner's control. For justifica-
tion of this broader use, see id. at 976; Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 354, 361-62 (1999). See also James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Prop-
erty?, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 30 (2003) (observing that one's definition of
the public domain depends both on the "granularity" with which particular uses of a
work are disaggregated and on whether merely formal free availability is considered
sufficient). As Michael Carroll has pointed out to me, an object can be in the public
domain with respect to one strand of intellectual property while also protected by
another strand; for example, a fact might be in the public domain with respect to
copyright but be protected under trade secret law.
46 See sources cited supra notes 37-39, which enumerate limitations on the exclu-
sive rights of the copyright owner.
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cassette player.47 Copy controls prevent fair use copying of
streaming video that would allow the video to be shown at a loca-
tion lacking a live Internet connection. The CSS TPM that pro-
tects a movie DVD makes it impossible to compile a series of
clips for critical or classroom use, and the region-coding system
prevents lending or selling a U.S.-designated DVD to a user in
Europe or Japan. Applying the anti-copy setting to a PDF docu-
ment makes it impossible to cut and paste small portions of text,
and the anti-print setting interferes with use of the document.
The proposed broadcast flag4 8 would limit the ability of consum-
ers to "time-shift" and "space-shift" television broadcasts.4 9
Public domain materials that are combined with protected mater-
ials and locked up with a TPM are functionally removed from the
public domain. To the extent that public domain materials cease
to be available in formats other than ones protected by TPMs,
those materials may be converted entirely from public domain to
pay-per-use status.5 ° The existence of TPMs that make it feasible
for publishers to charge licensing fees for a particular use tends
to lead courts to a determination that such uses are not within
fair use.51
It is true that there are often workarounds: the output of a CD
player may be recorded by using a microphone attached to a cas-
sette recorder, and video output may be captured by using a
video camera pointed at the display on a television screen or
computer monitor. 52 But it remains true that TPMs cut back on
the scope and usefulness of the fair use limitation on the exclu-
sive rights of the copyright owner.
47 Since a cassette tape is an analog recording medium, the making of such a copy
does not constitute infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
48 For more on the broadcast flag, see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
4 9 See CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 18, at 23. In
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984), the Supreme
Court held that time-shifting of analog television broadcasts for noncommercial pur-
poses in the home is a fair use.
50 See Nimmer, supra note 4, at 713.
51 See, e.g., INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 79-82 (discuss-
ing judicial interpretation of the fourth fair use factor); Bell, supra note 4, at 567-71
(same).
52 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that fair use may be made of a TPM-protected movie through "recording
portions of the video images and sounds on film or tape by pointing a camera, a
camcorder, or a microphone at a monitor as it displays the DVD movie"); 321 Stu-
dios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1102 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (same).
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In theory, circumvention of a use control to engage in fair use
is neither a violation of section 1201 nor an infringement of the
copyright owner's exclusive rights; as a practical matter, however,
few will be able to exercise this right because the trafficking ban
makes circumvention technologies hard to acquire. Moreover, to
the extent that publishers deploy access controls, circumvention
is a violation of section 1201 even if done to enable a fair use
(unless one of section 1201's own exceptions is applicable).
Another building block of the public domain is the absence of
copyright protection for what are generically called "ideas,"
which thus confines protection to "expression."53 Among other
things, the idea/expression dichotomy excludes protection for
facts while retaining the possibility of protection for the selection
and arrangement of facts.54 Because facts per se are not pro-
tected by copyright, they are also not protected by the anticir-
cumvention rules since each of the three anticircumvention
prohibitions is limited by its terms to copyright-protected
works.55 However, when facts are conjoined with copyrighted
expression and are locked up by means of a use control, the facts
gain de facto protection because of the unavailability of technol-
ogy for circumventing a use control.56
A third source of public domain material is the expiration of
copyright protection after the running of its term. Currently, the
term of copyright protection lasts until seventy years after the
death of the author or, in the case of a work made for hire,
ninety-five years after publication.57 TPMs, however, last for-
ever. There is no requirement that TPMs incorporate a mecha-
nism that renders them ineffective after a certain date, and I am
53 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery .... ").
54 The exclusion of facts from copyright protection is an aspect of the constitution-
ally mandated "originality" requirement. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1991).
55 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting circumvention of a technological mea-
sure that controls "access to a work protected under this title"); id. § 1201(a)(2)
(same); id. § 1201(b)(1) (prohibiting trafficking in a technology designed to circum-
vent a technological measure that protects "a right of a copyright owner under this
title in a work").
56 See Haimo Schack, Anti-Circumvention Measures and Restrictions in Licensing
Contracts as Instruments for Preventing Competition and Fair Use, 2002 U. ILL. J. L.
TECH. & POL'Y 321, 326-27 (noting that anticircumvention rules create "new mo-
nopolies in unprotected information [and] in simple databases").
57 17 U.S.C. § 302.
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unaware of any TPM technology that includes such a feature.
Deployment of TPMs thus effectively makes the duration of cop-
yright perpetual.58
We should take care not to overstate the impact of this perpet-
ual extension of copyright. The length of the copyright term,
combined with the pace of technological change, means that the
perpetuity of TPMs is irrelevant in most cases. By the time the
term of copyright expires, 70, 95, or 120 years hence, copyrighted
material stored now in a digital format will be unusable, TPM-
protected or not, because the equipment needed to render the
material audible or viewable will be obsolete. However, TPMs
will effectively extend the term of copyright if they are used to
lock up a work that is near the end of its term.
B. Reduced Access to Digital Information Goods
Another effect of the availability of legally backed TPMs to
reinforce copyright protection is the potential elimination of the
secondary market for information goods, which has the effect of
reducing access to those goods. Tethering technology is the pri-
mary source of this effect. A software copy encumbered by a
tethering measure that allows it to be used only on the original
purchaser's computer cannot be sold on the secondary market. It
also cannot be loaned by a library to the public or by an individ-
ual to a friend.59 This is despite the fact that the copyright laws
do not grant publishers any right to prevent the owner of a copy
of a computer program from loading the program on a computer
and using it.' Tethering TPMs are not widely used at present in
58 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 n.159
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[Tlechnological means of controlling access to works create a
risk, depending upon future technological and commercial developments, of limiting
access to works that are not protected by copyright such as works upon which copy-
right has expired."), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d
429 (2d Cir. 2001).
59 One consequence of the first-sale doctrine is that library lending of software
copies is not within the copyright owner's control. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)(A) (2000).
Individual lending of a software copy is likewise permitted as long as it is not done
for purposes of commercial advantage. See id. § 109(b)(1)(A).
60 Id. § 117(a). Despite frequent claims by software publishers to the contrary,
the fact that software is distributed subject to a license agreement does not prevent
transfer of ownership of the material object in which it is embodied and, therefore,
does not defeat the user's right under section 109(a) to sell the copy on the secon-
dary market or the secondary purchaser's right under section 117(a) to use the pro-
gram on a computer. See John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale
Rule: Are Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2004).
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connection with music CDs or movie DVDs,6 1 but at some point
publishers might find it expedient to implement such controls,
which would make it impossible to use protected copies bor-
rowed from a library and would put DVD-rental stores out of
business.
Resale and lending of copies containing copyrighted materials
is an important means of broadening access to those materials.62
Not everyone is able or willing to pay the full retail price for a
computer program, music CD, or movie DVD. If a copy is avail-
able for sale on the secondary market, such potential users can
become actual users.6 3 Consumers with lower levels of resources
or interest who are willing to make do with temporary access can
obtain copyrighted materials at no cost through library
borrowing.
The shift to a pay-per-use market for information goods might
depress use of those goods for reasons beyond the tethering re-
striction. First, absent some breakthrough in the system for as-
sessing usage fees, pay-per-use is likely to entail high transaction
costs in terms of the time and attention that users would be re-
quired to devote to deciding whether to purchase a particular
unit of content.64 Second, if users must pay for each unit of ac-
cess, they will face a disincentive against perusing material that is
of unknown value. Third, reduced access can also result when an
authorization code required to gain access to an information
good becomes lost or separated from the copy of the good, thus
rendering it unusable.65
On the other hand, TPMs may have a countervailing effect of
61 Note, however, that a limited form of tethering, region coding, is in widespread
use in connection with movie DVDs. See supra text accompanying note 15.
62 See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implica-
tions for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1388-89 (1998).
63 For example, Amazon.com recently offered Quicken 2005 Deluxe personal fi-
nance software for $53.99. At the same time, its Amazon Marketplace Sellers (third
parties who offer items via Amazon.com's website) offered 29 new and used copies
of the same software at a range of prices starting at $15.44.
64 See Clay Shirky, The Case Against Micropayments, Dec. 19, 2000, http://www.
openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2000/12/19/micropayments.html ("Micropayments ... waste
the users' mental effort in order to conserve cheap resources, by creating many tiny,
unpredictable transactions. Micropayments thus create in the mind of the user both
anxiety and confusion .... ).
65 The exceptions to the ban on circumventing access controls that the Librarian
of Congress created, discussed supra in note 43, allow circumvention to overcome
malfunctioning hardware-based controls ("dongles") but not to overcome a lost au-
thorization code, which is software-based.
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promoting access by facilitating the operation of price discrimi-
nation. By charging different users different prices for the same
good based on how highly each user values the good, a publisher
can broaden access to the good by charging a lower price to
lower-valuing users.6 6 Price discrimination can succeed only if
the publisher can prevent arbitrage, which occurs when a lower-
valuing user resells a good to a higher-valuing user. 67 A tether-
ing TPM can prevent arbitrage by making an information good
useless except when used by the original purchaser.
The benefits of price discrimination, however, should not be
overstated. First, a tethering TPM can prevent arbitrage only if it
succeeds in associating a copy of an information good with the
user's computer (or other intermediary device) at the time of
purchase rather than at the time of later use. Otherwise, the
lower-valuing user can resell the good before installing or other-
wise using it, and the tethering will take effect only upon use by
the higher-valuing user. This greatly limits the types of informa-
tion goods as to which tethering can promote price discrimina-
tion. Second, price discrimination has distributional
consequences that must be taken into account. In particular,
price discrimination leaves less surplus in the hands of consumers
and shifts more surplus to publishers. Indeed, perfect price dis-
crimination shifts the entire surplus to publishers.68 Third, price
discrimination is costly to implement and can be accomplished
only imperfectly, because sellers can never do better than a
rough approximation of a consumer's valuation of the product,69
because it is costly for sellers to gather the information needed to
engage in price discrimination, and because it is often costly for
consumers to participate in price discrimination.7 ° These extra
66 See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1203, 1238-39 (1998) (showing the economic effect of price discrimination).
67 See Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copy-
right Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 869-70, 874-76 (1997) (dis-
cussing arbitrage).
68 See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcs 435 (5th ed. 1999).
69 See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2072 (2000) ("Price discrimination, if you will,
can never be perfect, but is always lumpy.").
70 Recently, I spent a half hour or more filling out and mailing three rebate forms,
and I will likely be required to waste even more time when the rebates fail to arrive
and I have to make a follow-up inquiry. Rebates are a means of implementing price
discrimination. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUC-
TURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 493 (3d ed. 1990).
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costs and mismatches between consumer valuation and offering
price detract from broadened access.
C. Harm to Competition and Innovation
TPMs may be deployed and enforced in a manner that im-
pedes competition and innovation, with respect to both informa-
tion goods and ordinary manufactured goods.
1. Keeping Proprietary File Formats Proprietary
Apple Computer has rattled the DMCA saber to leverage the
popularity of its iPod digital music player so as to protect its
iTunes music download service from competition. Music
downloaded from iTunes is in a proprietary format that works
only on iPod players.71 RealNetworks, a competitor in the mar-
ket for music downloads, released software that converts music
from RealNetworks's format to Apple's format, thereby allowing
music purchased from RealNetworks to be played on iPods.72 If
Apple were successful in establishing that the RealNetworks
software is an illegal circumvention technology, the effect would
be anticompetitive.
2. Inhibiting Reverse Engineering
A software developer may find it necessary to analyze com-
puter code written by someone else for a variety of purposes,
many of which promote competition and innovation.7 3 To en-
71 See BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY, ITUNES: How COPYRIGHT,
CONTRACT, AND TECHNOLOGY SHAPE THE BUSINESS OF DIGITAL MEDIA-A CASE
STUDY 11 (June 15, 2004), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/uploads/
81/iTunesWhitePaper0604.pdf.
72 See GARTNERG2 & BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY, COPYRIGHT
AND DIGITAL MEDIA IN A POST-NAPSTER WORLD 46 (Version 2 Updated Jan. 2005),
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/files/wp2005.pdf; Cynthia L. Webb,
No Synchronicity for Apple, RealNetworks, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, July 30, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27081-2004Jul30.html (quoting
Apple CEO Steve Jobs as saying, "We are stunned that RealNetworks has adopted
the tactics and ethics of a hacker to break into the iPod, and we are investigating the
implications of their actions under the [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] and other
laws.") (alteration in original).
73 These purposes include "locating, assessing, and fixing bugs in software; analyz-
ing software to understand how to add additional features; understanding the inter-
nal design of a technical protection measure for research purposes; understanding its
internal design to develop a competing product; understanding its internal design in
order to make a compatible product, such as an alternative nonsoftware platform
[and] analyzing a technical measure to enable interoperability with data." Pamela
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gage in this sort of analysis, which is known as "reverse engineer-
ing," it is necessary to gain access to the code, and it is generally
also necessary to copy the code. If the code is protected by a
TPM, gaining the necessary access may be both difficult and, be-
cause of the anticircumvention rules, unlawful."4 While the an-
ticircumvention rules contain an exception permitting reverse
engineering,75 this exception is quite narrow in scope.7 6
3. Interfering with Encryption Research
A ban on circumvention makes it risky to engage in encryption
research. 77 Several high-profile incidents have brought this risk
home to legitimate researchers. In one case, Dmitry Sklyarov, a
Russian researcher, was arrested after he delivered a paper at a
conference. In the paper, Sklyarov described a program he had
developed that disabled the encryption system employed by the
Adobe Acrobat eBook. Although Sklyarov was later released,
federal officials prosecuted ElcomSoft Co. Ltd., the Russian
company that employed him (and that also sold the decryption
program), for violating section 1201.78 ElcomSoft was acquitted
by a jury verdict. 79 In another case, Princeton University Profes-
Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering,
111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1642 (2002).
74 Under at least some circumstances, copying the code will be a fair use and thus
neither a copyright infringement nor a violation of the anticircumvention rules. See
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("Atari did not violate Nintendo's copyright by deprocessing computer chips in
Atari's rightful possession. Atari could lawfully deprocess Nintendo's 10NES chips
to learn their unprotected ideas and processes."); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[W]here disassembly is the only way to
gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted com-
puter program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access, disas-
sembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law.").
75 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000).
76 See Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1184-
87 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (finding online multiplayer game server emulator is not within
exception as it fails the "sole purpose" and "independently created computer pro-
gram" criteria); Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 73, at 1635 n.289 (explaining
that § 1201(f) is narrower than the exception recognized in Sega v. Accolade).
77 See NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, LAW, ECONOMICS AND
CYBERSPACE 60 (2004) ("Anti-circumvention restrictions inevitably cover large
chunks of encryption research and other research fields in computer science.").
78 Although the program could be used in a way that infringed copyright, it also
had noninfringing fair uses. See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111,
1118-19 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
79 See Matt Richtel, Russian Company Cleared Of Illegal Software Sales, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002, at C4.
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sor Edward Felten was threatened with legal action if he should
present a paper explaining a method of cracking an encryption
system for protecting digital audio called the Secure Digital Mu-
sic Initiative-a method that he devised in response to a public
challenge issued by the developers of the encryption system.80
4. Lock-out Codes
Harm to competition can also occur when copyright-protected
computer programming code is used to interface with an authori-
zation code that allows the components of a machine to inter-
operate. It is not clear whether section 1201 is available to
enforce efforts to suppress competition, but a few cases are
suggestive.
In Sony Computer Entertainment America Inc. v. GameMas-
ters,81 Sony sued the seller of the Game Enhancer, a device that
plugs into Sony's PlayStation electronic game console and modi-
fies the operation of CD-ROM-based games that are played on
the console. Among other things, the Game Enhancer enables
the console to play games on CD-ROMs that contain a region
code that would ordinarily prevent the game from being played
on a console designed for a different region. In this case, users of
consoles manufactured for sale in the United States were enabled
to play games encoded for play on consoles manufactured for
sale in Japan or Europe. The court agreed with Sony's argument
that the Game Enhancer "circumvents the mechanism on the
PlayStation console that ensures the console operates only when
encrypted data is read from an authorized CD-ROM" and con-
cluded that Sony was likely to succeed in proving a violation of
the section 1201(a)(2) ban on trafficking in access-circumvention
devices.82
On the facts of this case, the application of section 1201 had
only a limited effect in suppressing competition: it allowed Sony
to prevent competition between CD-ROMs that it designated for
distribution in the United States and those that it designated for
distribution in Japan or Europe. But the court's rationale seems
80 See Pamela Samuelson, Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science, SCIENCE,
Sept. 14, 2001, at 2028. Felten sued for a determination that publication of his paper
would not violate the DMCA, but his case was dismissed. See John Schwartz, 2
Copyright Cases Decided in Favor of Entertainment Industry, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 29,
2001, at C4.
81 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
82 Id. at 987-88.
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to permit a publisher to use TPMs and section 1201 to enforce a
more thoroughgoing suppression of competition. For example,
an encrypted code on Sony-authorized CD-ROMs could be used
to lock out games manufactured by Sony's competitors. Any
method used to fool the PlayStation console into accepting the
unauthorized game would constitute circumvention of an access
control, and sellers of those games would be trafficking in
banned devices.
Two other cases present scenarios in which manufacturers have
been unsuccessful in their attempts to suppress competition by
invoking section 1201. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc. ,83 Lexmark sued a computer chip pro-
ducer whose chips were incorporated into aftermarket toner car-
tridges manufactured by third parties. Lexmark's printers
contain a computer program called the Printer Engine Program
that interacts with a computer chip on the toner cartridges that
Lexmark manufactures. If the chip furnishes the Printer Engine
Program with the correct authentication sequence, the printer
operates normally; if not, the printer refuses to function. Static
Control manufactures a chip called SMARTEK containing code
identical to the code in the chips that Lexmark installs in its toner
cartridges. Static Control sells the chips to third parties that
remanufacture toner cartridges that Lexmark has designated to
be used only once and then returned to Lexmark. The
SMARTEK chip allows these remanufactured cartridges to pro-
vide the Printer Engine Program with the requisite authentica-
tion sequence and therefore allows the cartridges to operate in a
Lexmark printer.
Lexmark argued that the SMARTEK chip was a device de-
signed to circumvent the authentication sequence, which
Lexmark characterized as a technological measure that "effec-
tively controls access" to the Printer Engine Program and to the
code in the toner cartridge chip.' The district court granted
Lexmark a preliminary injunction, finding that it was likely to
succeed in proving that Static Control violated the section
1201(a)(2) ban on trafficking in devices that circumvent access
83 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
84 For a device to violate the ban on circumventing access controls, it must defeat
a technological measure that "effectively controls access" to a copyrighted work. 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000).
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controls by manufacturing the SMARTEK chip.85
The appellate court disagreed. It held that the authentication
sequence did not qualify as a technological measure that "effec-
tively controls access" to the Printer Engine Program since that
program, which was not encrypted and could be read directly
from the printer's memory, was freely accessible to anyone in
possession of the printer.86 As the court explained: "Just as one
would not say that a lock on the back door of a house 'controls
access' to a house whose front door does not contain a lock...,
it does not make sense to say that this provision of the DMCA
applies to otherwise-readily-accessible copyrighted works."87
This rationale would appear to be easily evadable by a manu-
facturer that wished to use the anticircumvention rules to prevent
interoperability with a competitor's products. It would be simple
enough for Lexmark to encrypt the Printer Engine Program and
include the key needed to unlock it within the toner cartridge
chip. Yet other language in the court's opinion suggested a
broader rejection of the invocation of section 1201 for anticom-
petitive purposes. The court drew a distinction between the
copyrightable expression that Lexmark sought to protect, which
has no purpose but to control the functioning of a piece of ma-
chinery, and expression of the sort that is encoded on CDs and
DVDs, which is translated into music and movies that have the
purpose of acting on the human senses. The court seemed to in-
dicate that only the latter sort of copyrighted expression is enti-
tled to the protection of the anticircumvention rules.88 In
addition, a concurring judge explicitly declined to accept an in-
terpretation of section 1201 that would aid a manufacturer in
suppressing competition.89
Another case in which a manufacturer sought to use section
1201 to suppress competition is Chamberlain Group, Inc. v.
Skylink Technologies, Inc.9° Plaintiff Chamberlain, a manufac-
85 See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943
(E.D. Ky. 2003), vacated, 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
86 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 549.
87 Id. at 547.
88 Id. at 548.
89 See id. at 552 (Merritt, J., concurring) ("If we were to adopt Lexmark's reading
of the statute, manufacturers could potentially create monopolies for replacement
parts simply by using similar, but more creative, lock-out codes. Automobile manu-
facturers, for example, could control the entire market of replacement parts for their
vehicles by including lock-out chips.").
90 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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turer of garage door openers, invoked the anticircumvention
rules in an effort to prevent defendant Skylink from manufactur-
ing aftermarket handheld transmitters that would operate Cham-
berlain's garage doors. The two companies were competitors in
the manufacture of such transmitters. Chamberlain's garage
door openers contain a computer program that interprets a string
of bits, called a "rolling code," received from a handheld trans-
mitter. The rolling code changes each time the transmitter's but-
ton is pressed, and the program in the garage door opener
activates the motor that opens the door only if the rolling code
received from the transmitter satisfies a set of criteria generated
by an algorithm. According to Chamberlain, the algorithm was
designed to thwart potential burglars who would capture the
string as it was emitted from a transmitter and would later replay
it to open the door. Skylink's transmitters worked by doing an
end run around the algorithm implemented in Chamberlain's
computer code. The transmitters emitted a sequence of signals
that Chamberlain intended to be used only to reset the al-
gorithm. Chamberlain argued that Skylink's transmitter was a
device designed for the purpose of circumventing the rolling
code, which effectively controlled access to the computer pro-
gram, and therefore violated section 1201(a)(2), the ban on traf-
ficking in devices that circumvent access controls.
The appellate court upheld the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment to Skylink. 91 The court held that for there to be a
violation of the ban on trafficking in devices that circumvent ac-
cess controls, the accused device must be one that circumvents
access in a manner that results in infringement of a right pro-
tected by the Copyright Act.92 Moreover, the court held that
there can be no violation of the antitrafficking provision in the
absence of an act that circumvents an access control.93 In other
words, not just any breach of an access control triggers liability
under section 1201(a)(2): there must be a breach that results in
infringement.94
In adopting this narrow reading of the trafficking ban, the
court was self-consciously avoiding an alternative interpretation
91 Id. at 1204.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1196 n.13 ("For obvious reasons, § 1201(a)(2) trafficking liability cannot
exist in the absence of § 1201(a)(1) violations .....
9 4 Id. at 1203.
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that it feared would open the door to widespread use of section
1201 to suppress competition:
Chamberlain's proposed construction would allow any manu-
facturer of any product to add a single copyrighted sentence or
software fragment to its product, wrap the copyrighted mate-
rial in a trivial "encryption" scheme, and thereby gain the right
to restrict consumers' rights to use its products in conjunction
with competing products. In other words, Chamberlain's con-
struction of the DMCA would allow virtually any company to
attempt to leverage its sales into aftermarket monopolies ...95
The court's interpretation of section 1201 thus recognized its
potential use as a tool to suppress competition, and the court
sought to avert that outcome by means of a narrowing
construction.
It remains to be seen, however, whether this narrow construc-
tion of section 1201 will have staying power. Neither the require-
ment that the breach of an access control result in actual
infringement nor the rule that there can be no violation of the
trafficking ban absent an act of circumvention appears on the
face of the statute. Furthermore, if section 1201(a)(2) applies
only to devices whose use results in infringement of a copyright
owner's exclusive rights, that provision would seem to be redun-
dant with the section 1201(b) ban on trafficking in devices that
circumvent "protection afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner."96
The Lexmark and Chamberlain decisions indicate that at least
some courts are reluctant to allow section 1201 to be used to sup-
press competition in manufactured goods. However, it is too
early in the judicial construction of section 1201 to feel any confi-
dence that other courts will adopt the same viewpoint or .that
manufacturers will not devise other methods of incorporating
copyrighted code or text into their products that will satisfy even
a narrow construction of section 1201.
97
D. Privacy
TPMs can be implemented in ways that invade the privacy of
95 Id. at 1201 (footnote omitted).
96 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2000).
97 For further discussion of the contexts in which TPMs might be used to suppress
competition, see ELKIN-KOREN & SALZBERGER, supra note 77, at 42-43; Dan L.
Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1110-14 (2003).
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users of the protected content. 98 This may come about when a
publisher requires the user to divulge personal information
before the publisher will grant access to content protected by a
TPM.99 Some TPMs are implemented using a globally unique
identifier, which permits publishers to track users' preferences;
publishers may find this information useful as a means of imple-
menting price discrimination."° Copyright management infor-
mation systems, an adjunct to TPMs, enable publishers to keep
tabs on who is viewing their material. 101
E. Implications of the Multifaceted Impact of TPMs
As the above discussion indicates, legally backed TPMs have
both positive and negative impacts on society. To the extent that
they encourage publishers to make works available in digital for-
mats, TPMs advance one of the fundamental goals of copyright
by promoting access to creative output. On the other hand,
TPMs impose costs on society to the extent that they entail con-
traction of the public domain, elimination of the secondary mar-
ket, interference with competition, and intrusion on privacy.
Since TPMs are a mixed blessing, the optimal level of their
deployment, from society's standpoint, is probably something
98 See Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003)
(describing how TPMs can interfere with "intellectual privacy").
99 See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copy-
right Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 985 (1996) (describing the
potential use of TPMs for "profiling"); Comments of the Electronic Privacy Infor-
mation Center, In the Matter of Digital Entertainment and Rights Management,
Before the Technology Administration, Department of Commerce, July 17, 2002,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/drmtadrmcomments7.17.02.html ("In an attempt to se-
cure content, many DRM systems require the user to identify and authenticate a
right of access to the protected media."). A working party of the European Union
has recognized that collection of information via a digital rights management system
implicates privacy interests that the EU's Data Privacy Directive protects. DATA
PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL
FOR JUSTICE, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY, WORKING DOCUMENT ON DATA PROTEC-
TION ISSUES RELATED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Jan. 18, 2005), avail-
able at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ustice-home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/wpdocs/
2005_en.htm.
100 See Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and Trusted
Systems, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1269 (2000) (characterizing TPMs using hardware-
based identifiers as "pernicious from a privacy perspective"). On price discrimina-
tion, see supra text accompanying note 66.
101 See Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 135
(describing systems that "have the ability to secretly report back to the copyright
owner via the network on what the user was doing with the work, and the ability to
search the consumer's hard disk and report back on what else was there").
[Vol. 84, 2005]
Technological Protection Measures
less than the use of every available TPM on every copy of an
information good. It is therefore worthwhile to inquire into the
determinants of the efficacy of market forces in controlling the
use of TPMs.
IV
MODELING THE BEHAVIOR OF PUBLISHERS
IN THE MARKET FOR TPMs
Markets can do a very good job of optimizing the production
of goods and services, enabling the expression of consumer pref-
erences to bring about an economically efficient allocation of re-
sources. It is often convenient to regard the efficient level of
production of a particular good as the correct level; indeed, effi-
ciency is often regarded as the sole criterion for assessing a par-
ticular deployment of society's resources.
To assess the efficacy of consumer preferences in disciplining
publishers' implementation of TPMs under various market con-
ditions, we need to model how a rational publisher determines
whether to incorporate TPMs in a particular information good
and, if TPMs are used, what type of TPM to implement. The
standard tools of economic analysis are available for this pur-
pose. Neoclassical economics posits that a rational producer's
pricing and output decisions will depend on a set of factors, in-
cluding the number of sellers and buyers in a market, the sub-
stitutability of different goods, the existence of barriers to entry,
economies and diseconomies of scale, collusion among competi-
tors, the information possessed by market participants, the mag-
nitude of transaction costs, and the presence of externalities.
Since the addition of a TPM to an information good makes
that product less desirable to buyers, it is tempting to model the
addition of a TPM as the equivalent of a price increase. Use of
such a model would be a mistake, however, for it overlooks two
important distinctions between the two actions.
First, not all buyers consider the presence of a TPM to be an
undesirable feature. The user of a music CD who does not care
to make a copy for use in a car CD player or to give to a friend
and who does not plan to extract tracks to make a mix CD would
not value the CD any less if an anti-copy measure were added. A
user of DVDs who does not travel overseas may not care in the
least about region coding. If the TPM consists of a tethering re-
striction, a consumer who has no interest in using the copy on
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more than one device will not consider the restriction to be a
detriment. Indeed, many buyers may not even be aware that a
particular information good incorporates a TPM. By contrast,
economic analysis assumes that all rational consumers dislike a
price increase and that all prospective purchasers have a reserva-
tion price. Under this assumption, any price increase will alien-
ate the marginal purchaser. By contrast, the addition of TPMs
will not necessarily have that effect. Within a particular range of
TPM deployment, demand may be completely insensitive to the
presence of TPMs.
Second, the addition of a TPM can either increase or decrease
the demand for the product to which it is applied. The applica-
tion of a TPM results in two offsetting effects. On the one hand,
the TPM reduces the incidence of unauthorized use of the prod-
uct, and to that extent, the TPM brings about increased demand
for the product. If an anti-copy measure prevents a buyer from
making a copy and giving it to a friend, or if a tethering measure
prevents a buyer from disposing of a copy in the secondary mar-
ket, the producer may make an additional sale.102 On the other
hand, adding a TPM has a negative effect on sales by causing
some potential buyers-not all of them, since, as noted above,
some buyers are indifferent to the presence of a TPM-to defect
to a substitute product not burdened by a TPM. The TPM's net
effect on the demand for the product is the difference between
these two effects. By contrast, the effect of a price increase is
unambiguously to depress demand. 1°3
Nor can the addition of a TPM be accurately modeled as a
reduction in product quality. First, a producer's reduction of the
quality of its product usually has the effect of lowering manufac-
102 Of course, not all suppressed copying translates into additional sales. Many,
perhaps most, consumers who jump at the opportunity to enjoy an information good
for free would not, if denied that opportunity, stand in line to pay full price for it. In
a highly contested policy area-the impact of peer-to-peer sharing of music files-
one study found that only ten to twenty percent of file downloads result in a lost
sale, while another concluded that file sharing had no effect at all on sales. See
Daniel Gross, Does a Free Download Equal a Lost Sale?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004,
§ 3, at 4. See also WORKING PARTY ON THE INFORMATION ECONOMY, ORGANISA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DIGITAL BROADBAND
CONTENT: Music 78 (June 8, 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/2/
34995041.pdf ("It is very difficult to establish a basis to prove a causal relationship
between the size of the drop in music sales (i.e. the size of the downloading-induced
sales displacement) and the rise of file sharing .... ").
103 This is true for "ordinary goods," but not for the rarely encountered (except in
economics textbooks) "Giffen goods." See VARIAN, supra note 68, at 104-05.
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turing costs through substitution of cheaper materials or a
cheaper manufacturing process.1 0 4 By contrast, the addition of a
TPM results in an increase in the cost of production. It costs
money to develop or acquire the rights to a TPM technology, and
it may cost money to incorporate that measure into the product.
TPMs also generate consumer complaints, which cost money to
deal with.1" 5 Implementing a product-activation TPM requires
the publisher to maintain server-side systems to generate the
unique code number that prevents the software from being in-
stalled on another machine. Second, a reduction in product qual-
ity shifts the demand curve to the left.10 6 But, as explained
above, the addition of a TPM may shift the demand curve in ei-
ther direction or not at all.
The addition of TPMs thus generates tradeoffs for the pub-
lisher that differ from those facing a typical producer of goods
that is considering a quality decrease. The ordinary producer
must weigh the benefit of reduced costs against the detriment of
reduced demand. The publisher, on the other hand, weighs the
detriment of increased costs against an ambiguous effect on
demand.
104 It is conceivable that a producer might find it expedient to accept increased
manufacturing costs in combination with reduced product quality, as the condition
of receiving the benefits of planned obsolescence.
105 See Julie A. Mark, Note, Software Copying Policies: The Next Step in Piracy
Prevention?, 2 J.L. & TECH. 43, 45 (1987) ("An executive at one company estimated
that by eliminating hardware protection publishers could save five million dollars
per year in reduced support costs while increasing customer goodwill and eliminat-
ing copy protection fees."); Paul B. Carroll, On Your Honor: Software Firms Remove
Copy-Protection Devices, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1986, at 33 (reporting that in the
mid-1980s, one software industry representative stated that "20% to 25% of the in-
dustry's service calls are related to problems caused by copy protection").
106 This is true in the short term, but in the longer term, things get more compli-
cated. If the product is durable and a secondary market exists, lowering product
quality may have offsetting effects on demand. Reducing quality lowers demand,
both because the product becomes intrinsically less desirable and because its resale
value is reduced. On the other hand, a lower-quality product may wear out faster,
with the result that fewer items will make it to the secondary market. This will tend
to increase demand for the new items. For an analysis of a firm's output and pricing
decisions with respect to durable goods that takes the secondary market into ac-
count, see DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION 476-97 (3d ed. 2000). The existence of items on the secondary market
that are very durable and can be sold and resold many times can have a significant
effect on the market for new items. See Oz SHY, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THE-
ORY AND APPLICATIONS 377 (1995) (noting that availability of light aircraft on the
secondary market so reduced demand for new aircraft that several manufacturers
stopped producing them).
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Therefore, in modeling the effect that the addition of TPMs
has on publishers and consumers, we must start from scratch. I
make the following assumptions:
The TPMs incorporated into an information good can be quan-
tified according to some metric. That metric, which for present
purposes need not be specified, must indicate how restrictive the
TPM is perceived to be by users of the information good.107
Potential users have a range of preferences concerning the in-
corporation of TPMs into an information good. For some users,
addition of TPMs reduces the utility of the good, and different
types of TPMs have different effects on the utility the user exper-
iences. Other users are indifferent to the presence of TPMs, ei-
ther entirely or within some range.
Publishers will incorporate into their products the quantity of
TPMs that they expect will maximize their profits.
A publisher's optimization calculation depends on three com-
ponents: (1)'the quantity of sales lost due to the implementation
of a TPM through alienation of existing customers, which I refer
to as "alienated demand" or "AD";0 8 (2) the quantity of addi-
tional sales made to those who had previously been making un-
compensated use of copies owned by others but who can no
longer do so because of the implementation of a TPM, which I
call "recovered demand" or "RD";1" 9 and (3) the cost to the pub-
107 The plausibility of the existence of such a metric is easiest to establish in con-
nection with different versions of a particular TPM. For example, a TPM that allows
an MP3 file to be played on three devices constitutes a larger "quantity" of techno-
logical protection than one that imposes a limit of five devices. To arrange different
types of TPMs along a quantitative scale, we could imagine a shadow market in
which consumers bid for different versions of an information good that are encum-
bered with different combinations of TPMs. The metric orders the TPMs according
to the size of the bids they draw.
108 Implementing TPMs might result in loss of demand not only from existing
customers but also from prospective new customers. The idea is that one who is not
a customer might be exposed to an information good through an unauthorized copy
or distribution and might, as a result, become a paying customer. One such example
is when a person becomes acquainted with new music through an unauthorized
download of an MP3 file and then buys a CD of that music. Another example is
when a person becomes dependent on a software application through using an unau-
thorized copy and then finds it worthwhile to gain access to an authorized copy for
the technical support or to have the most recent version. For simplicity, we may
incorporate this effect into the AD curve.
109 Implementing TPMs might also benefit the publisher through entirely differ-
ent mechanisms. As discussed above in Part III.C, one potential effect of TPMs is to
lessen competition in a market other than the one for the information good that the
TPM is designed to protect. Furthermore, as discussed above in Part III.B, TPMs
may facilitate price discrimination, enabling the publisher to appropriate more of
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lisher of implementing the TPM.
The model assumes a status quo in Period 0 in which the pub-
lisher does not implement TPMs. In Period 0, the publisher's
profit is a function of the quantity the publisher sells, the price
per unit it receives, and its costs:
ni = n(q,p,c).
Its profit in Period 0 is thus
rIo = H(qop,co).'
In Period 1, the publisher adds TPMs to the product, which has
several effects. First, the use of TPMs changes demand by
AD = RD(qpm) - AD(qp,),
where qtpm is the quantity of TPMs that the publisher chooses to
implement, RD is the recovered demand, and AD is the alien-
ated demand. Second, the use of TPMs increases the publisher's
costs by
AC = C(qtpm),
where C(qtpm) is the cost to the publisher of implementing a given
quantity of TPMs. Since profit is revenue minus costs, the addi-
tion of TPMs changes profit by
All = pAD - C(qtpm).
Profit in Period 1 is thus
FI1 = F 0 + All = Flo + pAD - C(qtpm).
To determine the quantity of TPMs that maximizes H1, we set
I'l = 0. Then, we have
the surplus. To the extent that these effects exist, the publisher's incentive to imple-
ment the TPM is increased beyond the TPM's effect of increasing RD. For simplic-
ity, we may incorporate this effect into the RD curve.
110 To simplify matters, I assume that price remains constant from Period 0 to
Period 1. This will not necessarily be the case. If implementing TPMs causes de-
mand to rise, the publisher's average cost per unit may fall to the extent that econo-
mies of scale outweigh the costs of adding TPMs. In that case, the publisher could
lower its price and thereby capture additional consumers from the margin. On the
other hand, the publisher could maintain its price and make a larger profit per unit.
This pricing decision will depend on elasticity of demand and on a variety of other
factors that are extrinsic to the model.
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d(1 0 + pAD) dC(q, m)
dqtpm dqpm
In taking the derivative, 1l0 drops out since it does not vary
with qtpm. Since
d(pAD)
dqpm
is just marginal revenue and
dC(qtm)
dqtpm
is just marginal cost, the optimization condition is
MR(qp,,) = MC(qtpm).
This is strongly reminiscent of the optimization condition that
standard economic analysis applies in deriving the output deci-
sions of firms in competitive and monopolistic markets. But
there is an important difference. The variable here is the quan-
tity of TPMs that the publisher chooses to deploy, not (as is usual
in such analyses) the price or output quantity. Thus, in the pre-
sent context, "marginal revenue" measures how revenue changes
as the quantity of TPMs is varied, rather than how revenue
changes as the price or quantity of the product is varied.
We can most easily understand how changing the quantity of
TPMs affects a publisher's marginal revenue and marginal cost
by using a graphical representation. Figure 1 shows how adding a
given quantity of TPMs to an information good affects the de-
mand for that good. The vertical axis plots the quantity of TPMs
incorporated in the product, and the horizontal axis shows the
quantity of the product demanded. The curve AD shows how
the demand of existing authorized users for the product changes
as TPMs are added to the product in increasing quantities. The
intersection of curve AD with the horizontal axis shows the
quantity demanded when no TPM is used. Moving along this
curve upward and to the left, TPMs are introduced to the prod-
uct in increasing quantity, causing increasing numbers of users to
defect and therefore depressing demand. At its left end, curve
AD may turn vertical before reaching the vertical axis if all re-
maining users are indifferent to the addition of more TPMs, or it
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may intersect the vertical axis if the TPMs become so onerous
that all existing users defect.
Curve RD shows the additional sales of the product that are
made to consumers who, in the absence of TPMs, had used a
copy owned by another consumer. Its beginning at the origin in-
dicates the status quo. At its top end, curve RD turns vertical as
use of industrial-strength TPMs has flushed out all potential
buyers.'11
Curve NCD ("net change in demand") is the horizontal sum-
mation of curves AD and RD. It shows the combined effect of
the reduction in demand resulting from defections by existing
users and the increase in demand resulting from conversion of
would-be sharers, now thwarted by the presence of TPMs, into
paying customers.
Q of TPMs
AD RD NCD
Q demanded
Figure 1
As depicted in Figure 1, curve NCD intersects AD at the hori-
zontal axis and slopes upward to the left, indicating that the net
effect of adding TPMs is a reduction in demand. This, however,
Ill It is possible that at high levels of TPMs, the RD curve will go past vertical and
take on a negative slope, angling back toward the vertical axis. This would occur if
adding TPMs becomes counterproductive because some potential buyers who were
induced to buy at lower levels of TPMs become alienated and defect at higher levels.
To simplify the analysis, I assume that the slope of the RD curve remains non-nega-
tive within the range of TPMs applied.
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is not the inevitable shape of curve NCD. This shape results
from unstated assumptions incorporated into the shapes of
curves AD and RD. In particular, AD is drawn leaning more to
the left than RD leans to the right, indicating that the addition of
TPMs alienates more existing buyers than it attracts new buyers.
Figure 2 diagrams the opposite assumption. Curve RD re-
mains unchanged from Figure 1, but curve AD is drawn more
closely vertical, indicating that existing users are bothered only
slightly by the addition of TPMs. As a result, summing these two
curves yields a curve NCD that slopes upward and to the right,
indicating that the addition of TPMs has had a net positive effect
on demand. It is likewise possible to vary the shape of curve RD.
We can move the top end closer to the vertical axis, reflecting an
assumption that the TPMs are less effective in turning unautho-
rized users into authorized users.
Q of TPMs
RD A NCD
Q demanded
Figure 2
By varying our assumptions about consumer preferences and
the effectiveness of TPMs in suppressing unauthorized use, we
can generate a family of plausible AD curves and another of RD
curves. Figure 3 shows the former; Figure 4, the latter.
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Q of TPMs
AD1 AD 2 AD3 AD 4 AD5
Q demanded
Figure 3
Q of TPMs
RD4RD3 RD 5
Q demanded
Figure 4
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By mixing and matching these ADi and RDi curves, we get a
family of corresponding NCDi curves, as shown in Figure 5.
Q of TPMs
NCDI NCD2  NCD 3  NCD4  NCD5
Q demanded
Figure 5
For example, curve NCD1 would result from combining RD1
with AD,, curve NCD 5 would result from combining RD5 with
AD5 , etc.
The possibility that there are NCD curves shaped like NCD 4
and NCD 5 demonstrates why the addition of TPMs cannot realis-
tically be modeled as a price increase. These curves represent
upward-sloping demand curves-a species not observed in the
neoclassical world of microeconomic theory. 112
The RD curve resulting from a particular TPM may not be in-
dependent of the AD curve associated with the same product-
TPM combination. It might be, for example, that current users
of an information good dislike a TPM just to the extent that it is
effective in reducing unauthorized use. If so, we would expect
that a product-TPM combination with an AD curve like AD 1
would have an RD curve like RD5 . To the extent that there is
such a correlation, we would not expect to find combinations like
112 Recall, however, that these curves model demand as a function of quantity of
TPMs rather than as a function of price. Therefore, the unusual shape of these
curves does not contradict any of the assumptions of neoclassical economics.
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RD5 with AD5 or RD , with AD,. As a result, the family of NCD
curves would be clustered around the NCD 3 curve rather than
deviating outward like the NCD1 and NCD5 curves. On the
other hand, a TPM that is very effective at preventing unautho-
rized use and that is designed so as to annoy as few current users
as possible might well result in a combination of curves like RDs
with AD 5, resulting in an outcome like NCD 5.
The next step in the analysis is to derive the marginal revenue
curve associated with each product-TPM combination. In eco-
nomic analysis, it is common for a marginal revenue curve to
show the change in revenue resulting from a change in price or
output of a product. In the current context, as noted above, we
are interested in how revenue changes in response to a change in
the quantity of TPMs incorporated into the product. The margi-
nal revenue curve is derived from the demand curve; it is the
slope of the demand curve at each point.1 13 Since we have a fam-
ily of NCD curves, we will correspondingly have a family of MR
curves, as shown in Figure 6.
In this graph, the axes have been reconfigured: the horizontal
axis plots the quantity of TPMs, and the vertical axis shows the
marginal revenue associated with the quantity of each TPM.
Marginal revenue curve MR5 corresponds to demand curve
NCD 5. Curve MR5 intersects the vertical axis at a positive value,
corresponding to the fact that NCD5 shows demand rising as the
quantity of TPMs increases. MR5 is a decreasing function since
NCD5 becomes continually steeper, showing decreasing returns
to the addition of more TPMs. MR5 intersects the horizontal axis
at the point (that is, the quantity of TPMs) where NCD 5 turns
vertical, meaning that adding more TPMs yields no further reve-
nue increase.
Analogously, curve MR, corresponds to demand curve NCDI.
Since NCDI shows the quantity demanded decreasing as TPMs
are added, MR, remains in negative territory until it intersects
the horizontal axis at the point where NCD, turns vertical.
Curve MR 3, corresponding to NCD 3, is depicted at a constant
113 Marginal revenue is actually the slope of the total revenue curve; that is, it
represents the rate at which total revenue changes. See B. CURTIs EATON & DIANE
F. EATON, MICROECONoMIcs 288 (2d ed. 1991). In the scenario under considera-
tion, price is constant. Since total revenue equals price times demand, the slope of
the total revenue curve is the same as the slope of the demand curve.
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tity demanded is insensitive to the 
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price
MR5
MIR3 Q Of TPMs
MR-2
NIR1
Figure 6
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A firm's marginal cost curve is typically depicted as U-shaped.
That shape is attributable to the presumed effects of scale econo-
mies: initial increases in output bring increasing returns to scale
as the firm is able to dispose of productive resources more effi-
ciently, while further increases in output bring decreasing returns
as it becomes necessary to substitute higher-cost inputs. Figure 7
depicts the standard determination of the profit-maximizing out-
put of a firm in a competitive market, which occurs at the quan-
tity q* where marginal cost equals price.
This standard depiction of a marginal cost curve cannot be im-
ported into the present context, due to a crucial difference be-
tween the two situations. In the standard analysis, cost is
graphed against the quantity of output of a good; scale economies
and diseconomies result from variations in the costs of the rele-
vant inputs. Here, we graph cost against the quantity of TPMs
incorporated in each exemplar of the good. Instead of producing
fewer or more exemplars, the publisher is incorporating a greater
or lesser quantity of TPMs into each exemplar.
Thus, it is not at all clear what shape to assign to the curve
depicting a publisher's marginal cost of adding TPMs to the
good. We must assume that the rational publisher will first de-
ploy the TPM that yields the greatest bang for the buck. For-
mally, the publisher will first deploy the TPM that maximizes
?MR - C, where C represents the cost of implementing the
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TPM.1 1 5 The TPM that maximizes this value will not necessarily
be the one that is least expensive for the publisher to use. It
might be that a relatively expensive TPM is the most effective at
thwarting would-be unauthorized users and is also designed to
minimize the inconvenience that it creates for the user.
Therefore, the publisher's marginal cost curve can take a vari-
ety of shapes. All we can say for sure is that the curve always lies
above the horizontal axis, since TPMs must cost something. If
we overlay the range of MC curves on the family of MR curves
shown in Figure 6, we can see the possible relationships between
the MC and MR curves. The shaded rectangle in Figure 8 shows
the region within which the MC curve may wander.
Price
MR5
MR4  - -------------
Q of TPMs
MR 2
MR1
Figure 8
The two dashed lines show two types of relationships (among
various other possibilities) that the MC curve may have with the
MR curves. MC, lies above the MR curves throughout its length.
That means that there is no cost-effective TPM available. Every
115 This assumes that ?MR > 0. As we are about to see, if ?MR = 0, the publisher
will not implement any TPM.
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available TPM costs more to implement than the marginal reve-
nue it generates. If this is the case, the publisher will not use any
TPMs. Curve MC2 lies above some of the MR curves but inter-
sects others. Thus, if the MR curve applying to a particular prod-
uct is MR5 and the applicable MC curve is MC 2, then the
publisher maximizes profits by implementing the quantity of
TPMs indicated by point q*.1l 6 If, however, the applicable MR
curve is MR 4, no TPMs will be implemented.
Suppose the MR curve applying to the product is MR3 , MR 2,
or MR,. In that case, no TPMs will be used no matter what the
marginal cost since, by hypothesis, adding any level of TPMs will
reduce total revenue.
We can now summarize our conclusions concerning the behav-
ior of a publisher in determining what level of TPMs to incorpo-
rate into a particular product. The publisher will choose a level
of TPMs such that marginal revenue with respect to the quantity
of TPMs equals marginal cost of adding TPMs. The marginal
revenue curve may assume a variety of shapes. If the relevant
MR curve lies entirely below the horizontal axis, the publisher
will maximize profits by using no TPMs. If the MR curve lies
above the horizontal axis and the marginal cost curve intersects
that MR curve, the publisher maximizes profits by adding some
positive quantity of TPMs.
V
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO VARIOUS
MARKET STRUCTURES
Publishers of copyrighted materials have frequently been char-
acterized as monopolists.117 There is a kernel of truth to this
characterization, but the full truth is more complicated. 18 No
116 If the MC curve is not monotonic, it might intersect an MR curve at more than
one point. This would make it more difficult to determine the level of TPMs that
maximizes profits, for we would then have to compute the total cost of implement-
ing TPMs and compare that to the total change in marginal revenue along the whole
TPM axis. To avoid this complication, I will assume that the MC curve intersects the
MR curve only at one point or that it is U-shaped and intersects at two points.
117 See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(referencing "the copyright monopoly granted by Congress"); Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 154 (1975) ("The Copyright Act ... gives to a
copyright holder a monopoly limited to specified 'exclusive' rights in his copyrighted
works.").
118 See Boyle, supra note 45, at 8 n.23 (discussing whether intellectual property
rules create what is appropriately characterized as monopoly); Margaret Jane Radin,
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single characterization can accurately describe the market for
copyrighted goods as a whole. The market structure confronting
a particular market participant with respect to a particular prod-
uct will depend on factors such as how many other market par-
ticipants offer similar products and whether other products in the
market are close substitutes. Different sellers will face different
market conditions: near-perfect (or at least robust) competition,
monopolistic competition (which itself describes a range of mar-
ket structures), oligopoly, and monopoly.
A. Competitive Markets
Perfect competition in a particular market is defined with re-
spect to a particular homogeneous good or a set of goods that
consumers view as perfect substitutes for each other. The princi-
pal conditions that define a competitive market are as follows:
(1) The number of buyers and sellers in the market is large
enough that each is of insignificant size in comparison with the
quantity of the good supplied in the market; (2) there are no bar-
riers impeding entry to or exit from the market; (3) buyers and
sellers possess all relevant information about the market; and (4)
there are no externalities.1 19
Some segments of the market for information goods are rela-
tively close to the ideal of perfect competition. The market for
pornographic movies might be an example. There are many sell-
ers of these movies, and there are also many buyers. We might
reasonably posit that, for a large segment of the consuming pub-
lic, one such movie is a close substitute for another. No doubt
there are exceptional pornographic films that are more highly
valued by consumers, for one reason or another. Such movies
might define a separate market. Under these conditions, no indi-
vidual seller of movies has any market power. 2 ° If one seller
raises its price, it will experience a significant loss of sales as buy-
ers choose other movies that are just as desirable and are also
cheaper. If the market structure was truly one of perfect compe-
Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & CoM. 509, 518 (1996) ("Market power
involves something more than exclusion rights, such as dominant market share with
high barriers to entry.").
1 19 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 106, at 57-58; SCHERER & Ross, supra
note 70, at 17-18.120 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 106, at 92 ("Whenever a firm can influ-
ence the price it receives for its product, the firm is said to have monopoly power or
market power.").
[Vol. 84, 2005]
Technological Protection Measures
tition, a seller that raised its price would see its sales drop to
zero.
Another plausible example in the same mold is a recording of
classical music by an undistinguished orchestra. Buyers may be
willing to pay a higher price for a recording by a highly regarded
orchestra or conductor, but other recordings will be viewed as
generic and will be selected on the criterion of price alone.
Other candidates include simple computer programs, generic
landscape paintings, books of crossword puzzles, and Harlequin
romance novels.
In addition to competition arising from such substitutive con-
tent, there may be competition due to substitutive formats. A
movie publisher may offer a particular film in both DVD and
VHS videotape formats, each incorporating a different type of
TPM. A music publisher might offer a recording on CD, cassette
tape, and digital audio tape. Although it may seem counterintui-
tive for a publisher to compete against itself in this way, multiple-
format releases may make sense as a means of price discrimina-
tion or market segmentation. Economies of scale and network
externalities may limit the impact of this sort of competition as
newer technologies displace the old-movie rental stores increas-
ingly stock more DVDs and fewer VHS tapes; record stores carry
mostly CDs, a few cassettes, and no DAT or vinyl phonograph
records-and diversity is replaced by monoculture. 121
With the competitive market as the baseline, we can proceed
to consider how a change in the market structure affects the re-
sponsiveness of publishers to consumer preferences in their deci-
sions whether to implement TPMs.
B. Monopoly
As observed above, there is a kernel of truth in the common
characterization of copyright as conferring a monopoly on the
copyright owner: copyright owners have a legal right to prevent
anyone else from making available in the marketplace works that
are identical or substantially similar to their own works. 22 The
exclusive rights of the copyright owner constitute what may be
called monopoly in common parlance, but more is required for
121 On network externalities, see Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Exter-
nalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985).
122 See Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992) (explain-
ing that substantial similarity is the prerequisite for infringement).
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there to be monopoly as economists use the term. For the econo-
mist, monopoly describes a situation in which a seller offers a
product that has no close substitutes.123 The lack of close substi-
tutes gives the seller market power: it can raise price above mar-
ginal cost without seeing sales go to zero (as would occur in the
case of pure competition). For a monopoly to exist more than
momentarily, there must be barriers to entry that protect the mo-
nopolist from competitors offering similar products. But the mo-
nopolist is not entirely immune from consumer sovereignty. If
the monopolist raises the price of its product, the quantity it is
able to sell will decrease as some buyers forgo purchasing the
product because the price exceeds the value they place on it.
This is reflected in the downward-sloping demand curve that is
conventionally used to model the behavior of monopolists. 124
The absence of close substitutes means that the monopolist
need not be as responsive to consumer preferences as a partici-
pant in a competitive market must be. If the monopolist raises its
price marginally, it will lose those marginal customers whose val-
uation of the product is less than the increased price. But with a
small price increase, the monopolist will not lose many customers
to competitors. This result is true by definition, there being no
close substitutes for the monopolist's product. The same reason-
ing holds true for product characteristics: minor reductions in
the desirability of product characteristics will not cause the mo-
nopolist to lose many customers, but major quality reductions
might have more of an effect.
Some publishers of information goods occupy a position that
could reasonably be characterized as monopolistic. 25 Consider,
for example, publishers of computer operating systems. An op-
erating system has no close substitutes because the costs of
switching to a different operating system, due to software and
123 See EATON & EATON, supra note 113, at 286 ("A firm is a monopoly if no
other firm produces either the same good or a close substitute for it."). The legal
definition of monopoly-the one that is relevant in assessing compliance with the
Sherman Act-is a bit different. "Monopoly power" under the Sherman Act con-
sists of "the power to control prices or exclude competition." United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
124 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 106, at 87 ("A monopoly faces a down-
ward-sloping demand curve and sets a price above marginal cost.").
125 Whether a particular market participant is a monopolist is a contestable issue.
See EATON & EATON, supra note 113, at 286 ("Th[e] definition of monopoly is un-
avoidably ambiguous because we can't define 'close substitute' with perfect
precision.").
[Vol. 84, 2005]
Technological Protection Measures
hardware incompatibilities and other switching costs, are very
large.1 26 Microsoft has been adjudged a monopolist in the mar-
ket for Intel-compatible personal computers with respect to its
Windows operating system, 27 and Apple is arguably just as much
of a monopolist in the market for Macintosh-compatible operat-
ing systems. A seller of the Linux operating system, however, is
not a monopolist: since Linux is an open-source product, anyone
who wishes to sell it competitively is free to do so.
The publisher of a book that defines its own genre might be
considered a monopolist. 28 Consider the (currently hypotheti-
cal) seventh book of the Harry Potter series. There are no close
substitutes: no other book comes close to offering the conclusion
of the story of Harry's epic struggle against the forces of evil. If
the publisher raised the price of the book, the publisher would
lose sales, but that is true of any monopolist. The only substi-
tutes for purchasing the hardcover book involve waiting: bor-
126 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (per curiam) (referencing the district court's finding that "consumers would
not switch from Windows to Mac OS in response to a substantial price increase
because of the costs of acquiring the new hardware needed to run Mac OS (an Ap-
ple computer and peripherals) and compatible software applications, as well as be-
cause of the effort involved in learning the new system and transferring files to its
format.").
127 See id. at 51-56.
128 Similarly, monopoly status might also be attributed to one-of-a-kind movies,
musical recordings, or works of art. But to say that a producer is a monopolist with
respect to a particular product is not to say that the producer is violating the Sher-
man Act's proscription against monopolizing a market.
Some courts have been unreceptive to the idea that a single product may define a
relevant market for purposes of antitrust analysis. See Theatre Party Assocs., Inc. v.
Shubert Org., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 150, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("It is well settled that a
manufacturer's monopoly over the distribution of its own product cannot form the
basis of a valid monopolization claim."); Lynch Bus. Machs., Inc. v. A.B. Dick Co.,
594 F. Supp. 59, 66 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ("Monopoly power cannot be shown through a
manufacturer's control of its own product, because a manufacturer cannot monopo-
lize its own product."). Other courts have held that such a conclusion may be
reached under exceptional circumstances. See Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d
116, 121 (9th Cir. 1972) ("A single manufacturer's products might be found to com-
prise, by themselves, a relevant market for the purposes of a monopolization claim,
if they are so unique or so dominant in the market in which they compete that any
action by the manufacturer to increase his control over his product virtually assures
that competition in the market will be destroyed."); Levitch v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("Thus, only when a manufacturer's
product is so unique or so dominant in the market will this single product define the
relevant market.").
In any event, however, it is clear that an information good may have no close substi-
tutes, which is the factor that is relevant for purposes of our model of a publisher's
decision whether to implement TPMs.
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rowing the book from a library or a friend, buying the less-
expensive paperback edition, buying a used copy, or maybe see-
ing the movie (which may not be a very close substitute). These
are imperfect substitutes. The delay in gratification, the used
condition or temporary availability of the book, the transaction
costs incurred in locating a used book, etc., are all product char-
acteristics that will make the substitute less desirable for some
subset of potential buyers. The secondary market constrains the
market power of the publisher, but it does so only to a limited
extent. 29
Under the standard analysis, a monopolist that is unable to en-
gage in price discrimination will, in comparison to a competitive
supplier, raise its price and reduce its output, and in so doing, it
will realize monopoly rents while imposing a deadweight loss on
society.130 The analysis applied to monopolists fundamentally
differs from that applied to pure competitors. Because each pro-
ducer in a purely competitive market is a price taker, its profit-
maximizing calculation depends only on the shape of its produc-
tion function and involves finding an output level at which its
marginal cost equals the product's price. But a monopolist can
set its own price and so must consider both its production func-
tion and the shape of the demand curve that it faces.
The difference between the approach of a publisher in a mo-
nopolistic market and one in a competitive market in determin-
ing whether to implement TPMs is less marked than under the
standard analysis. The fact that no close substitutes are available
changes the shape of the relevant demand curves, but it does not
change the basic analysis.
Let us go back to Figure 1 and consider the shape of the AD
curve. Under competitive conditions, the introduction of TPMs
causes a relatively rapid decrease in demand, as buyers who are
129 In the Alcoa case, United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425
(2d Cir. 1945), Judge Hand determined that the availability of scrap aluminum on
the secondary market does not dilute the market power of Alcoa, the monopoly
producer of new aluminum. Several economists have concluded that Hand's analy-
sis was largely correct, as an empirical matter, with respect to the aluminum market.
See Darius W. Gaskins, Jr., Alcoa Revisited: The Welfare Implications of a Second-
hand Market, 7 J. EcoN. THEORY 254 (1974); Peter L. Swan, Alcoa: The Influence of
Recycling on Monopoly Power, 88 J. POL. ECON. 76 (1980). More generally, how-
ever, the existence of a secondary market does constrain a firm's market power to an
extent that varies with market conditions. See Franklin M. Fisher, Alcoa Revisited:
Comment, 9 J. ECON. THEORY 357 (1974).
13 0 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 106, at 88-94.
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sensitive to TPMs defect in favor of close substitutes. If the
product has no close substitutes, we would expect a lower rate of
defection. Just as a monopolist suffers less of a reduction in de-
mand from a price increase than does a seller in a competitive
market, the monopolist suffers less of a reduction in demand
when it adds TPMs than does a pure competitor.
To test our intuition on this, we may consider the Windows
operating system as the poster child of an information good with
no close substitutes. Microsoft first implemented a tethering sys-
tem, called "product activation," to control use of its Windows
software when it released Windows XP in August 2001. Product
activation usually proceeds transparently, but a user who changes
the computer's hardware components or reformats the hard
drive might experience the annoyance of having to reactivate
Windows.13 1  Some commentators predicted substantial con-
sumer resistance to the new activation requirement,132 but this
does not seem to have materialized.133 This outcome is hardly
surprising: switching from Windows to the Mac OS or Linux re-
quires the user to incur massive costs to purchase new software
and (for Mac) hardware, to reinstall and reconfigure software ap-
plications, to learn how to use the new system, and so forth. Few
Windows users dislike the tethering TPM enough to be willing to
incur these expenses.
We should therefore expect that under monopoly, the AD
curve in Figure 1 will veer less sharply to the left from its inter-
section with the horizontal axis in comparison to competitive
131 See Microsoft, Windows XP Product Activation, Aug. 29, 2002, http://www.
microsoft.com/windowsxp/evaluation/features/activation.mspx ("If you overhaul
your computer by replacing a substantial number of hardware components, it may
appear to be a different PC. You may have to reactivate Windows XP."). If you
have arithmophobia, forget about it. See Lawrence J. Magid, Tech 101 PC Focus:
Yet Another Step to Start Windows XP, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 2001, at T8 ("The
software offered a toll-free number. I was kept on hold for five minutes and then
connected to an operator who asked me to read a 50-digit code generated by the
activation program. He typed it in his computer, which, in turn, generated a 42-digit
code that he read to me as I typed.").132 See Jube Shiver Jr., Microsoft Ships XP, Hoping to Revive Sales, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2001, at C1 ("A poll of visitors to PCWorld.com, publisher of San Fran-
cisco-based PC World magazine, found 'a near-unanimous thumbs-down' to product
activation. Experts say the feature could trigger a consumer backlash that would
further dampen PC sales.").
133 See Paul Thurrott, OS Market Share: Microsoft Stomps the Competition,
WINDOwsIT PRo, Oct. 9, 2003, http://www.winnetmag.com/Article/ArticleID/40481/
40481.html ("Windows desktop OS sales worldwide increased from 93.2 percent of
the market in 2001 to 93.8 percent in 2002 .... ").
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conditions. The relationship between an AD curve under com-
petition and one under monopoly, ceteris paribus, might look
something like Figure 9: compare AD under competition (gray)
with AD' under monopoly (black).
Q of TPMs
RD NCD
D D' NCD'
Q demanded
Figure 9
Now let us consider the shape of the RD curve under monop-
oly. The recovered demand consists of those users of the product
who, without TPMs, had been able to satisfy their desire for the
product through methods that do not result in compensation to
the publisher (such as borrowing a copy from a friend or a li-
brary, obtaining an unauthorized copy, or buying a used copy on
the secondary market) and whose demand for the product is suf-
ficiently strong that they continue using it even after the pub-
lisher implements TPMs that require them to use it on the
publisher's terms. In a competitive market, users who, due to the
implementation of TPMs, are unable to continue making unau-
thorized use of the product have two options: they can pay the
publisher for authorized use of the product, or they can switch to
another product that is a close substitute and is not protected by
TPMs. In a monopolistic market, the alternative to paying for
use of the product is to switch to a product that is not a close
substitute. Since switching to a close substitute is, by definition,
less expensive than switching to a more distant substitute, we
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should expect that switching will be more likely to occur in a
competitive market.
Thus, a consumer who, due to the implementation of a tether-
ing measure, can no longer borrow a certain brand of generic
classical music recordings from a friend may well switch to bor-
rowing another publisher's untethered recordings and will not
contribute to the first publisher's recovered demand. But a con-
sumer who has been in the habit of installing one copy of Win-
dows on two computers and can no longer do so because of the
product activation requirement will probably buy a second copy
of Windows XP rather than switching to Linux, and this will in-
crease Microsoft's recovered demand. Figure 9 depicts RD
under competition (gray) and RD' under monopoly (black).
Since both the AD curve and the RD curve lean more to the
right under monopolistic conditions than under competition,
their horizontal summation, NCD, will likewise incline more to
the right. Compare NCD under competition (gray) with NCD'
under monopoly (black).
Following through the implications of this analysis, the family
of NCD curves will incline further to the right under monopoly
than under competition. Figure 10 shows the NCD curves under
competition (gray) compared to the NCD' curves under monop-
oly (black). Finally, the associated MR curves will tend to shift
upward, as shown in Figure 11 (depicting only the monopoly
curves, MRj'). There is no reason to expect that the marginal
cost of implementing TPMs will be higher under monopoly as
compared to a competitive market. Therefore, the MC curve
should intersect the applicable MR curve further to the right,
leading the publisher to implement a larger quantity of TPMs
under monopoly than under competition.
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NCD 2' NCD 3 '
NCD 3 NCD 4
NCD 4' NCD 5 '
NCD5
Q demanded
Figure 10
Q of TPMs
Figure 11
This does not mean, of course, that every publisher will imple-
ment TPMs in its products in markets where it holds a monopoly
position. A monopolist, like any other producer, will only imple-
MR5 '
MR4 '
MR3 '
MR2'
MR1'
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ment TPMs if the benefits that it expects to receive (additional
sales due to reduced unauthorized use) exceed the costs that it
expects to incur (lost sales due to alienating current customers
and the costs of implementing TPMs). This analysis simply
means that, all else being equal, a publisher is more likely to im-
plement TPMs in a product to the extent that the product has no
close substitutes. This result accords with the intuition that a mo-
nopolist can be less responsive to consumer preferences than can
a seller in a competitive market.
This analysis also shows that the mechanics of a monopolist's
calculation of what quantity of TPMs will maximize its profit do
not differ from those of the competitor. The difference lies only
in the shape of the relevant demand functions.
C. Monopolistic Competition
Competitive markets and monopolized markets represent two
extremes. Between these extremes lie various gradations of mar-
kets that can be usefully modeled as monopolistic competition.
In a market characterized by monopolistic competition, each
seller is the sole supplier of a good that, while possessing unique
characteristics, has fairly close substitutes in the market. Still, the
substitute products are different enough from each other that
sellers will have some market power. Unlike sellers in a perfectly
competitive market, a monopolistic competitor can raise its price
by some amount without its sales dropping to zero. However,
the products are close enough substitutes that sellers cannot be-
have like monopolists: if a monopolistic competitor raises its
price even modestly, some buyers will defect to the supplier of a
substitute good. Thus, monopolistic competitors, like monopo-
lists, face a downward-sloping demand curve rather than the hor-
izontal curve faced by the seller in a competitive market, but the
curve facing the monopolistic competitor is flatter (slope is closer
to zero) than the curve facing the monopolist. The greater the
differentiation between a seller's products and other products in
the market, the more market power the seller can exercise.'
Whether one product is differentiated from another depends
134 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392 (1956)
("As the producers of a standardized product bring about significant differentiations
of quality, design, or packaging in the product that permit differences of use, compe-
tition becomes to a greater or less degree incomplete and the producer's power over
price and competition greater over his article and its use, according to the differenti-
ation he is able to create and maintain.").
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entirely on consumer perception. Thus, if two products are ob-
jectively indistinguishable but are nevertheless perceived by con-
sumers as having different characteristics, which might happen
because of branding or advertising, then they are not perfect sub-
stitutes. Conversely, two products with objectively different
characteristics are perfect substitutes for each other if consumers
perceive them as identical.
135
The standard economic analysis of monopolistic competition
resembles that of monopoly in some respects and that of perfect
competition in others. In long-run equilibrium, sellers in monop-
olistic competition earn no monopoly rents. If one seller is mak-
ing economic profits in the short run, this will induce entry by
new market participants that will supply products that are closer
substitutes for the first seller's products than what currently ex-
ists in the market, and prices will be driven down toward the
competitive level. However, since the demand curve slopes
downward, marginal revenue is less than price. Therefore, the
equilibrium price will be more than marginal cost, resulting in
deadweight loss, albeit less than the deadweight loss resulting
from monopoly.136
Most information goods are offered in markets that are mo-
nopolistically competitive. 37 Copyright assures that each prod-
uct will be unique. Occasionally, as discussed above, these
unique goods will have such close substitutes that sellers will
have no significant market power. Perhaps even more rarely will
a product have characteristics that allow its producer to exercise
anything resembling monopoly power. Most information goods
fall within the broad range between these extremes. Novels,
textbooks, movies, paintings, and recordings of country music
and opera stars are all unique, but most of these products have
reasonably close substitutes such that if the producer raised its
price substantially, a significant proportion of its customers
would buy a substitute product instead.
A monopolistic competitor's determination whether to imple-
ment TPMs with its product follows exactly the same course as
described above for sellers in monopolistic and competitive mar-
135 See EDGAR K. BROWNING & MARK A. ZUPAN, MICROECONOMIcs: THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS 356 (8th ed. 2004).
136 See id. at 357-60; SCHERER & Ross, supra note 70, at 21-25.
137 See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 212, 246-51 (2004).
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kets. The closer the substitute products, the more the demand
curves will resemble those of a competitive market; the more dis-
tant the substitutes, the more the demand curves will resemble
those of a monopolistic market.
D. Oligopoly
We have thus far been assuming that the publisher of an infor-
mation good decides whether to implement TPMs on a product-
by-product basis. That is, a publisher that offers a range of infor-
mation goods might decide to implement TPMs with some of its
products but not with others, depending on the relationship be-
tween the respective marginal cost and marginal revenue curves.
The market for each good might be competitive, monopolistic, or
monopolistically competitive.
In some sectors of the information goods industry, however,
publishers might make a single decision whether to apply TPMs
to their entire range of products, rather than considering each
product individually. This might be a sensible course of action if
the costs of gathering and analyzing the data necessary for mak-
ing optimization decisions for each product exceed the potential
benefits or if increasing returns to scale make a catalogue-wide
implementation of TPMs advantageous. If only a few publishers
dominated the industry sector, the decision whether to imple-
ment TPMs would be affected by some of the considerations that
enter into the price and output decisions of oligopolists.
Oligopoly is defined by a market structure in which there are
few sellers (but more than one) and in which substantial barriers
to entry exist. 138 From the standpoint of modeling a firm's op-
timization decisions, the most significant difference between oli-
gopoly and the two extremes of competition and monopoly is
that under oligopoly each producer must take into account the
anticipated and actual actions of rival producers. 139 In a compet-
itive market, each producer is small relative to the size of the
market; thus, the behavior of any one producer has only a negli-
gible effect on the other firms and can be safely ignored. Under
monopoly, there are, by definition, no rivals to be concerned
about within a broad range of pricing options (though at some
138 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 106, at 7; SCHERER & Ross, supra note
70, at 17-18.
139 See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 70, at 200 ("The basic difficulty facing an
oligopolist is uncertainty about rival actions and reactions.").
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elevated price, the monopolist must worry about the actions of
producers offering distant substitutes).140
For this reason, economists find it more difficult to predict firm
behavior under oligopoly than under either monopoly or compe-
tition. Economists apply a variety of models to oligopoly behav-
ior, differing in their assumptions about firm behavior, such as
the extent to which firms manage to cooperate. 141 Collusion
among oligopolists results in a combination that behaves like a
single monopolist. As the number of rival firms increases, non-
cooperative behavior leads to outcomes closer to the competitive
ideal and to situations resembling a Prisoner's Dilemma, in which
each firm may follow a dominant strategy that fails to maximize
its profits. 42
What these oligopoly models have in common derives from the
dynamics of both firm and consumer behavior when price and
output change. Assuming a firm has some market power, when
it raises the price of its product it experiences a reduction in
quantity demanded but realizes a higher profit per item sold.
Whether it will be profit enhancing to implement a price increase
(or, conversely, a price decrease) depends on the relative magni-
tudes of these two effects. However, the quantity a firm can sell
depends not only on its own price but also on the price charged
by other firms offering potential substitutes. Thus, under oligo-
polistic conditions, a change in price by one firm may signifi-
cantly affect the other firms in the market and call forth a
response from those firms. If Firm A cuts its price, Firm B,
which produces a substitute good, may be compelled to cut its
price too, lest a large proportion of its customers defect to Firm
A. A price cut by Firm B will have an impact on Firm A, which
may respond by changing its price. Out of this interaction may
come equilibrium at a competitive price level, equilibrium at a
supracompetitive level, formation of a cartel that raises price to
the monopoly level, or unpredictable oscillation. 143
The market for recorded music presents an oligopolistic mar-
ket structure. In 2003, the five major record labels accounted for
about seventy-five percent of the industry worldwide.'" In Au-
140 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 106, at 153.
141 See id. at 154-55.
142 See id. at 153-86; SCHERER & Ross, supra note 70, at 199-226.
143 See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 70, at 199-208.
144 See Recorded Global Music Sales Down 7.6 Percent, DCD Bus. REP., Sept. 29,
2004, at *1, available at LEXIS News, All (English, Full Text).
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gust 2004, two of the majors, Sony and BMG, merged their oper-
1451 h blations in all markets except Japan, so the bulk of the industry
is now controlled by four firms. While the record labels might
decide on a CD-by-CD basis whether to implement TPMs (and
have done so recently in testing new technologies), a label might
decide instead to implement TPMs across its entire catalogue,
across an entire genre, or within an entire geographic market.
For example, Sony (Japan) announced its decision to eliminate
TPMs from all CDs that it releases in the Japanese market.'46
As we saw above, introduction of TPMs cannot usefully be
modeled as a price increase since the effect of the former is not
unambiguously to dampen demand. For the same reason, econo-
mists' models of oligopoly pricing behavior cannot usefully be
applied to model how publishers in an oligopolistic market deter-
mine whether to implement TPMs. To develop an appropriate
model, we must consider the dynamic effects of the introduction
of TPMs in an oligopolistic market.
Suppose, for example, that Universal Music must decide
whether to implement anti-copy technology on its CDs and that
none of the other major record labels currently uses such tech-
nology. Assume that Universal has done the research to deter-
mine how many of its current customers are likely to defect to
close substitutes and how many unauthorized users are likely to
become customers if it adds copy protection. Assume also that,
based on this research, Universal determines that the benefits (to
it) of adding copy protection will outweigh the costs, and, there-
fore, it decides to implement this TPM.
Now consider how Universal's move affects its rival Sony
BMG. Assume that, before Universal's move, Sony BMG had
done its own research and had concluded that adding copy pro-
tection would produce a net detriment. 147 But Universal's deci-
sion to implement TPMs affects Sony BMG's calculations, for it
means that Sony BMG's customers will no longer have an incen-
tive to defect to any CDs in Universal's catalogue, which no
145 See Sony Corp.: Deal Creating Music Company With Bertelsmann Is Com-
pleted, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2004, at B6.
146 See Steve McClure, Copy Control Fades in Japan: Labels Turning Away from
CCCDs, BILLBOARD, Oct. 16, 2004, at 41.
147 Sony BMG's analysis might plausibly yield a result contrary to Universal's if,
for example, the closest substitutes for Universal's products are within its own cata-
logue while the closest substitutes for Sony BMG's belong to the catalogues of other
publishers.
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longer offer the advantage of being freely copyable. Some of
those customers may still defect to a more distant substitute in
the catalogue of Warner or EMI, and some may desert the CD
market altogether and buy a cassette tape, a movie DVD, a video
game, or even a book. Still, Sony BMG can expect that some of
the customers it counted as prospective defectors will now re-
main customers in the face of its own implementation of copy
protection. Therefore, Universal's implementation of TPMs may
make it profitable for Sony BMG to do the same.
Expressing this same logic in terms of the model developed
above, Universal's action causes Sony BMG's AD curve to lean
more to the right, but leaves its RD curve unchanged. This
means that Sony BMG's NCD curve will lean more to the right,
and its MR curve will shift upward. This shift may bring the MR
curve into intersection with the MC curve for some anti-copy
technology, making it profitable for Sony BMG to implement
this technology.
Now, assuming that Sony BMG responds by implementing
copy protection, let us consider how this response affects Univer-
sal. The Universal customers who were offended by its imple-
mentation of copy protection now have fewer places to turn.
Those customers whose closest substitute is in Sony BMG's cata-
logue now have that option cut off, since those CDs are no more
copyable than Universal's. Therefore, Sony BMG's adoption of
copy protection benefits Universal. Furthermore, now that both
Universal and Sony BMG have copy protection, Warner and
EMI will have to redo their own calculations as they realize that
implementation of copy protection will result in fewer customer
defections than they previously anticipated. The resulting shift of
their MR curves may make it profitable for Warner and EMI to
join Universal and Sony BMG in adding copy controls.
Moreover, the anticipation of how the rivals will respond may
help to bring about the first firm's initial move. Let us go back to
our initial hypothetical in which Universal was deciding whether
to implement TPMs. Suppose that Universal's calculations led it
to conclude that if it alone were to implement copy controls, the
net impact on it would be negative since many of its customers
would defect to other labels. Looking ahead one step, Universal
might recognize that once it makes its move, one or more of its
rivals may find it profitable to respond by adding copy controls,
which will have a positive effect on Universal's demand. Univer-
[Vol. 84, 2005]
Technological Protection Measures
sal might then implement TPMs in the expectation that its rivals
will follow suit.
Oligopolistic market conditions may give impetus to an indus-
try-wide shift toward TPMs. As more and more publishers im-
plement TPMs, consumers become more habituated and
resigned to this feature of information goods. Once this condi-
tion sets in, the TPM is no longer perceived as an annoyance but
rather as an inevitable fact of life. For example, the inability to
fast-forward through the commercials at the beginning of a DVD
movie may have seemed quite noisome the first time it was en-
countered, but after consumers experience the phenomenon on a
dozen different movies they may no longer even notice it. If
there are only a few sellers, standardization on a particular prod-
uct feature that is in the interest of sellers but not of consumers is
apt to happen more quickly and lead to a self-reinforcing
habituation.
E. Summary
The foregoing analysis shows that a profit-maximizing pub-
lisher is subject to the discipline of consumer demand in deter-
mining whether to implement TPMs. This is true regardless of
whether the market in which the publisher acts is characterized
by competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition, or oligop-
oly. The more competition that exists, the less likely it is, all else
being equal, that publishers will find it profit maximizing to im-
plement TPMs. Even under conditions of perfect competition,
however, a publisher may find it profitable to implement TPMs,
depending on factors such as the incidence of unauthorized use
and the sensitivity of its customers to a particular type of TPM.
VI
SOME PAGES OF HISTORY
As the above discussion indicates, a publisher's decision
whether to implement TPMs will be based on its best estimates
of (1) the magnitude of recovered demand, (2) the magnitude of
alienated demand, and (3) the cost of implementing a TPM.
These quantities are not directly observable ex ante, but are the
consequences of a variety of contextual factors. For a publisher
to determine whether implementing TPMs will promote its inter-
ests, the publisher must take these factors into account.
We have already identified two of these contextual factors: the
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degree of competition that exists from products that are close
substitutes and the direct cost of implementing a TPM. In identi-
fying additional factors, we need not limit ourselves to theory,
but may consult history. During the past few decades, publishers
of information goods have implemented various types of TPMs.
Some of these implementations have been successful; in other
cases, the publisher decided to withdraw the TPM.
What follows is a brief review of several examples of the im-
plementation of TPMs. These examples suggest several addi-
tional factors that affect the shapes of the alienated demand,
recovered demand, and TPM cost curves. If we were able to
identify all the factors that determine the shapes of these curves,
we might hope to use them as inputs to the model presented in
this Article to explain why a publisher decided to implement or
withdraw TPMs in any particular context or to make predictions
about a publisher's behavior with respect to TPMs. However,
while a model can help us recognize how various factors affect
the incentives facing economic agents, it is often the case with
economic modeling that the ascertainable factors un-
derdetermine human action.
A. Case Studies
1. Software Copy Protection
In the late 1970s, most publishers of software for personal
computers began outfitting their products with anti-copy technol-
ogy.14 8 They adopted this strategy based on their perception that
many users of their software were making unauthorized copies of
it, allowing others to make use of the software without paying for
it. 1
49
By 1987 or so, virtually all software publishers had discontin-
ued the use of anti-copy technology. The software publishers'
decision to eliminate copy protection has been commonly ex-
plained as a response to consumer resistance 150 and to the ease
148 See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, A Victory for the Pirates? Software Firms Abandon
Their Key Defense Against Illegal Copying, TIME, Oct. 20, 1986, at 86.
149 See Carroll, supra note 105, at 33 (citing "industry estimates that as many as
half the programs in use on microcomputers were illegal copies").
150 See STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB 202 (1987) (explaining that software
publishers "were forced to drop copy-protection schemes ...because non-copy-
protected competitors were grabbing the market"); David M. Hornik, Recent De-
velopment, Combating Software Piracy: The Sofilifting Problem, 7 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 377, 414 (1994) ("[C]opy protection annoyed legitimate users by interfering
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with which the technology could be circumvented.15' Users of
the software, particularly institutional customers,152 complained
that copy protection prevented them from making copies for le-
gitimate purposes, such as to install a program from a floppy dis-
kette onto a hard drive or to make a backup copy of the hard
drive.' 53  Getting "permission" from the software publisher to
make a copy for such a purpose could be an arduous undertak-
ing.154 Evidence that consumers actually did consider copy pro-
tection a serious detriment comes from a marketing experiment
conducted by software publisher Borland International in 1984.
Borland offered a copy-protected version of a program called
Sidekick for $54.95 and an unprotected version for $84.95. De-
spite the fifty-five percent price differential, the unprotected ver-
sion outsold the protected version by a five-to-one margin.
155
In a 1998 piece, Julie Cohen presciently suggested that the dec-
laration of consumer victory over software copy protection was
with necessary computer functions, such as hard drive installation or data backup.");
P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright, Contract and Code: What Will Remain of the Public
Domain?, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 77, 87 (2000) ("In the 1980s a massive consumer
boycott prevented the market success of 'copy protected' software."); Joseph P. Liu,
Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REv. 397, 425 (2003) ("Con-
sumers rejected [software copy protection] because it made software less useful.");
Pamela Samuelson, Will the Copyright Office be Obsolete in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 55, 59 (1994) ("The main reason for the fail-
ure of copy protection schemes was that consumers did not favor them."); Carroll,
supra note 105, at 33 (quoting Microsoft chairman Bill Gates as declaring, "The
customer won."); T.R. Reid, Consumers Win as More Software Firms End Copy
Protection, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1986, at F13 ("[C]ustomers ... simply refused to
buy copy-protected software whenever there was a halfway decent alternative.");
T.R. Reid, Let Freedom-from Copy Protection Gimmicks-Ring, WASH. POST,
Apr. 28, 1986, at F25 ("Corporate buyers (who are mainly MS-DOS users) have told
the software houses that they won't shell out any more for programs that are
protected.").
151 See Kory D. Christensen, Note, Fighting Software Piracy in Cyberspace: Legal
and Technological Solutions, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 435, 467 (1997)
("[P]ublishers learned that every copy protection scheme, no matter how sophisti-
cated, was eventually 'cracked' (or defeated) by an equally clever hacker."); Hornik,
supra note 150, at 414 ("[C]opy protection proved too easy to circumvent; programs
quickly emerged that cracked the copy codes, making it possible to copy at will.").
152 See Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 148, at 86 (the Department of Defense "banned
the purchase of any protected programs for DOD use").
153 See Carroll, supra note 105, at 33 ("[T]he protection devices make it difficult
to copy the programs for legitimate reasons."); Reid, Consumers Win, supra note
150, at F13 ("[I]t is only prudent-indeed, essential-for any personal computer
user to make a copy or two of every new program purchased.").
154 See Carroll, supra note 105, at 33 (describing the steps that a user must go
through to obtain a new diskette from the publisher).
155 See BRAND, supra note 150, at 202; Carroll, supra note 105, at 33.
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premature. 56 She noted that an important reason for the with-
drawal of copy protection was that the 1980s-era copy-protection
technologies interfered with legitimate uses of the software, and
she observed that the newer generation of these technologies had
solved some of those problems.
More recent experience lends support to her analysis. In 2001,
Microsoft added product activation, a tethering technology, to its
Office XP and Windows XP products. 157 There is no indication
that consumer resistance is causing Microsoft to consider remov-
ing this TPM. In 2004, product activation started appearing on
Macintosh software, including QuarkXPress desktop publishing
software and Photoshop image editing software. 58 Product acti-
vation eliminates some of the problems associated with the
1980s-era copy-protection schemes: it does not interfere with
making a backup copy or installing the program on the hard
drive, and it is not prone to cause system crashes. Product activa-
tion, however, has its own usability problems.159
TPMs for software thus appear to be making a comeback. But
before hailing the triumph of the counterrevolution, we must
consider the TurboTax tethering episode. In the 2002 tax-year
version of its market-leading tax-preparation program, Intuit im-
plemented a tethering TPM using a product-activation system.
Intuit said that it decided to implement the measure because it
was experiencing a high level of "pass-along piracy"160 : it sold 7.5
million copies of TurboTax, which were used to file 15 million tax
returns.16 1 The tethering technology allowed TurboTax to be in-
stalled and operated on more than one computer, but TurboTax
would print or file the completed tax return only from the ma-
chine on which the program had been activated.
The reaction by commentators and consumers was swift and
fierce. Walter Mossberg, in his influential Wall Street Journal
technology column, denounced Intuit for its decision "to treat all
its TurboTax customers like potential criminals," and, on account
156 See Cohen, supra note 6, at 523-26.
157 See Walter S. Mossberg, Microsoft Cracks Down On Sharing Windows Among
Home Users, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at B1.
158 See Philip Michaels, Activation Nation, MACWORLD, June 2004, at 20.
159 See supra note 131.
160 David Becker, Intuit Offers TurboTax Tests, Apologies, C-NET, Feb. 24,2003,
http://news.com.com/Intuit+offers+TurboTaxTmests%2C+apologies/2100-1040_3-985
648.html.
161 See Andrew Ratner, TurboTax Software Fuels Indignation from E-Filers,
BALT. SUN, Mar. 9, 2003, at 1D.
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of the product activation requirement, he "emphatically recom-
mend[ed]" that consumers purchase a competing product, H&R
Block's TaxCut, instead.162 Users complained that the tethering
measure could be troublesome if they got a new computer after
installing the program on an old one, 63 and some swore off
TurboTax altogether. 164 H&R Block capitalized on the bad pub-
licity by launching a campaign to persuade TurboTax users to
switch to TaxCut, which was TPM-free. 165
Intuit initially responded by backpedaling, agreeing that its
product activation measure was problematic and promising that
it would use a different approach in the following year's ver-
sion, 66 but within a few months, it conceded defeat and an-
nounced that it would abandon TPMs altogether.1 67 Even more
abjectly, Intuit wrote an open letter of apology to its consumers
and published the letter in two major newspapers. 68
Intuit's obtuse implementation of the tethering measure also
helped to sink the measure. Installation of TurboTax surrepti-
tiously installed a program that ran in the computer's back-
ground, monitoring the computer for use of TurboTax, and that
remained on the computer even after the user uninstalled
TurboTax. In addition, the TPM worked by storing the activation
code on a portion of the hard drive that could not be accessed by
the computer user.169 This implementation spawned rumors that
TurboTax was installing a form of spyware on the user's com-
puter. Although Intuit denied this, the company recognized that
162 Walter S. Mossberg, Of Top Tax Programs, One Has Developed an Insulting
Approach, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2003, at B1.
163 See Turbotax Anti-Piracy Code Spurs Backlash, L.A. TimEs, Jan. 9, 2003, at
C3.
164 See Ratner, supra note 161, at 1D ("Thousands of customers complained
about the maneuver in 'chat rooms' and 'Web logs.' Many identified themselves as
longtime, loyal users who, to Intuit's dismay, threatened not to use the product
again.").
165 See Lisa Baertlein, TurboTax Anti-Piracy Limit Gone, Intuit Says, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Oct. 13, 2003, at C1.
166 See Becker, supra note 160.
167 See Intuit Backs Down on Anti-Piracy Feature, HOUSTON CHRON., May 16,
2003, at 4 ("Intuit will dump an unpopular anti-piracy feature from its top-selling
TurboTax software, reversing course on a measure that turned out to be more
trouble than it was worth.").
168 See Intuit Sorry in TurboTax Piracy Flap, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 2003, at 8
(describing publication of letter as an advertisement in USA Today and the Wall
Street Journal).
169 See Becker, supra note 160; Mossberg, supra note 162, at B1.
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its implementation created a great deal of consumer ill will.17°
The TPM also created difficulties for some users in installing
TurboTax.171
Intuit's ordeal has not prevented other software publishers
from implementing TPMs. For example, Symantec Corp. in-
cluded a tethering measure in the 2004 version of its Norton An-
tiVirus software and announced its intention to use product
activation in all of its products. 72
2. The DVD Content Scramble System and User Operation
Prohibition Codes
Movies on DVD, which are by some measures the most rapidly
adopted home entertainment format in history,173 incorporate
the Content Scramble System (CSS) TPM. CSS prevents a
DVD's content from being accessed on nonconforming playback
devices, enables the publisher to prevent a user from copying a
DVD using standard equipment, and allows coding of DVDs so
that they are playable only on machines manufactured for a par-
ticular region of the world. In addition, the DVD-Video stan-
dard that is used in encoding DVD movies enables the publisher
to incorporate User Operation Prohibition codes, which prevent
the user from engaging in certain operations such as fast-
forwarding. 74
Consumer distaste for these measures is evidently robust. A
program called DeCSS, which was devised by software hobbyists
as a sort of protest against TPMs and allowed CSS-encrypted
DVD movies to be decrypted and copied in degraded form onto
a compact disc, has been widely available for download since late
1999, despite a judicial determination that DeCSS violates the
antitrafficking provisions of the DMCA. 175 Several companies
offered software that allowed users to make copies of CSS-en-
170 See Hiawatha Bray, TurboTax Feature Draws Flak: Intuit Denies 'Spyware"
Charge, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 2003, at C3.
171 See Ratner, supra note 161, at 1D (describing travails of one sophisticated user
who was unable to activate his installation).
172 Mike Musgrove, Norton AntiVirus to Include Product Activation Code, WASH.
PosT, Aug. 29, 2003, at El.
173 See Jim Krane, Half of U.S. Homes Now Have DVD Players, Feb. 6, 2003,
http://www.detnews.com/2003/technology/0302/06/technology-78165.htm.
174 See supra note 16.
175See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 311
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429
(2d Cir. 2001).
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crypted DVDs, but lawsuits involving the movie studios caused
the most prominent supplier of this software to shut down.'7 6
Many users probably find it irksome that they cannot fast-for-
ward past the FBI warning or the trailers at the beginning of a
DVD. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that movie studios are
about to eliminate their use of these TPMs in response to con-
sumer preferences.
3. DIVX DVD Format
The DIVX format for DVD movies177 is, like the TurboTax ex-
perience, an example of a TPM implementation that quickly
went down in flames. Introduced in September 1998, DIVX was
a proprietary format for encoding data on a DVD that was
backed principally by Circuit City, a national consumer electron-
ics retailer. The system allowed the user of a DIVX disc to view
it as many times as desired, but only within a set period of time,
usually 48 hours, after the initial viewing.178 The DIVX player
was connected to a central server via a telephone line, enabling
the user, upon payment of a fee, to reactivate a disc for addi-
tional viewing time or to remove the viewing restriction entirely.
Introduction of the DIVX format gave rise to an anti-DIVX
movement, which flowered in the form of websites urging con-
sumers not to buy the discs.' 79 Several constituencies opposed
DIVX, including Circuit City's competitors, video rental stores,
and content owners that favored video-on-demand. 180
DIVX never gained wide popularity. An alternative format
for DVD movies based on the DVD-Video standard had been
introduced in the United States in 1997. Although early DVD
players were priced at $1,000 and up, the price rapidly dropped,
and DVD-Video was quickly adopted.18' In June 1999, Circuit
176 See 321 Studios Ends Operations, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 5, 2004, at C6; 321 Studios
v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Para-
mount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970, 2004 WL 402756 (S.D.N.Y.
March 3, 2004).
177 The DIVX technology discussed here should not be confused with the MPEG-
4 video compression standard, which is known as DivX.
178 See R. J. Dunnill, The Origins of the Original Divx, Jan. 17, 2002, http://www.
g4techtv.com/techtvvault/features/35912/TheOrigins of-theOriginal-Divx.html.
179 Id.
180 See id.
181 See DVD Frequently Asked Questions (and Answers), § 1.5, http://www.dvdde
mystified.com/dvdfaq.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
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City announced that it was discontinuing the DIVX format. 82
A variant on the DIVX concept has recently hit the market in
the form of self-destructing DVDs. The discs begin to degrade
after being exposed to the air and become unusable after forty-
eight hours.183
4. Copy Protection on Music CDs
In the past few years, record labels have been experimenting
with implementing copy protection TPMs on their music CDs,
with mixed results. There were some early missteps-some
TPMs made CDs unplayable in computers and automobile CD
players and even damaged computer CD drives,'84 while other
TPMs were easily circumvented. 185 Copy-protected CDs were
not well received in Japan, which prompted Sony Japan to dis-
continue copy protection, and independent label Avex to reduce
its use of the technology.' 86 Sony's move has been ascribed to
discontent by its customers, who found that the TPM prevented
them from converting songs into MP3 format so that they could
be played on portable MP3 players.187
Still, use of copy protection for music CDs seems to be on the
upswing in Europe and the United States. One reason for this
may be a shift in the technology employed. Previous copy-pro-
tection systems prevented all copying and were implemented in a
way that caused some CDs to be unplayable on a computer CD-
ROM drive. The new copy-protection technology allows a cer-
182 See DIVX Bites the Dust, June 21, 1999, http://hometheater.about.com/library/
weekly/aa062199.htm.
183 See Rachel Abramowitz, Is the Concept of Throwaway DVDs Really a
Keeper?, L.A. TiMEs, Oct. 18, 2004, at El.
184 See Howard Cohen, Compact Risk, MIAMI HERALD, July 3, 2002, at 1C.
185 One TPM could be neutralized by marking the rim of a protected CD with a
black felt-tip marker. See Cliff Edwards, A Big Hole in Sony's Copyright Shield?,
Bus. WK., June 10, 2002, at 12 ("'They spend millions on copy protection, and a 20
cents marker breaks it. haha,' said one posting on geek.com."). Another TPM could
be avoided by holding down a computer's shift key while loading the CD. Hit CD
with Copy Protection May Signal Fan Acceptance, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June
23, 2004, at *1, available at 2004 WL 81868206 (quoting the CEO of a TPM-maker
describing the shift-key workaround as a feature, not a bug) (electronic copy on file
with author).
186 See McClure, supra note 146, at 41.
187 See Angry Consumers Prompt Sony Music to Drop CD Copy Protection, ASIA
PULSE, Oct. 1, 2004, at *1, available at LEXIS News ("The switch was prompted by
consumers who are frustrated with the copy-protected format because it prevents
them from downloading music to portable digital music players such as APPLE
COMPUTER INC.'s iPod.") (copy on file with Oregon Law Review).
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tain number of copies of protected CDs to be made, which en-
ables users to create portable MP3 files. The record labels view
the new approach as a compromise, since it makes the TPM
more palatable to consumers while still preventing unlimited
copying. 188
B. Factors Influencing a Publisher's TPM Calculations
The experiences with TPMs recounted above suggest several
factors that go into determining the recovered demand, the alien-
ated demand, and the total cost associated with the implementa-
tion of a TPM. It is apparent that a publisher's decision whether
to implement TPMs depends on several considerations that do
not enter into the standard analysis of a firm's profit-maximizing
decision making. In particular, the characteristics of the availa-
ble TPMs weigh heavily in the calculations.
1. The Degree of Competition
As already noted, the existence of close substitutes has the ef-
fect of decreasing recovered demand and increasing alienated de-
mand. This means that the marginal revenue curve will shift
down, making it less advantageous for a publisher to implement
TPMs. The existence of close substitutes is well correlated with
the outcomes discussed above. Close substitutes were available
for the 1980s-era software' 89  and the 2002 version of
TurboTax. 9° Microsoft's Windows XP and Office XP, on the
188 See John Ross, More Music CDs Protected from Pirates, COLUMBUS Dis-
PATCH, Nov. 8, 2004, at 1E ("To address playability problems, companies developing
anti-piracy software have shifted from programs that render discs unreadable in
computers to those that control the number of copies made on Macs and PCs.");
Eric Schumacher-Rasmussen, Get in the Ring: Major Labels Get More Aggressive
with Copy-Protection Technology, EMEDIA, Oct. 1, 2004, at 8 (noting that the new
technology "should take care of one of the biggest consumer complaints about copy-
protected CDs so far: ... fans can't copy tracks from some discs to their iPods or
other MP3 players.").189 See Samuelson, supra note 4, at 566 n.245 ("Firms with similar products who
were willing to sell their products without copy-protection systems attracted enough
customers that the leading firms eventually abandoned their technical protection
schemes."); Reid, Consumers Win, supra note 150, at F13 ("There now is so much
great software around in nonprotected form that a buyer has no need to buy copy-
protected software.").
190 See Alan S. Kay, Rating the Tax Programs, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2004, at F7
("Both the [TurboTax and TaxCut] programs look and work remarkably alike
.... "); Mossberg, supra note 162, at B1 (describing TurboTax and TaxCut as "nearly
identical").
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other hand, lack close substitutes.191 In the case of DIVX, the
close substitute was an alternative format, DVD-Video, rather
than alternative content. DVDs, with their accompanying CSS
encryption, may be viewed as having a close substitute in an al-
ternative format, VHS videotape, or as having no close substitute
since DVDs have a number of features that consumers appear to
value and that VHS tapes lack. Music CDs may be viewed as
having many close substitutes, if the CDs are considered individ-
ually, or as having few, if the record labels act like oligopolists.
2. Legal Prohibition of Circumvention
Since section 1201 became effective,'192 it has become more
costly for consumers to circumvent access controls and use con-
trols. The costs include the risk of legal liability and the time and
expense of locating or creating circumvention technology. As a
result of this increased cost, an unauthorized user may find it
cheaper to buy an authorized version of the product than to use
circumvention technology. The result is to increase the recov-
ered demand and, correspondingly, to shift the marginal revenue
curve upward. In the 1980s, there were no clear rules against
circumvention of TPMs, and the first court challenge of an anti-
anti-copy technology resulted in a determination that the circum-
vention device did not violate the copyright laws since it had a
substantial noninfringing use.193 Thus, the 1980s copy-protection
technology, unlike the Windows XP and TurboTax technologies,
did not have the benefit of legal prohibitions on circumvention.
DIVX's brief existence roughly coincided with the effective date
191 This is less true for Office than for Windows. Although several of the Office
program formats have become de facto standards for exchanging documents, a free
open-source version of Office is available. See OpenOffice.org, http://www.open
office.org. Free software, however, is not without its costs: users may choose to buy
Office XP with its TPM rather than using OpenOffice.org because information costs
have prevented them from learning about the free version, because of feared or
actual incompatibilities presented by the free version, because less technical support
or less frequent bug fixes are available, because the free version has fewer features,
etc.
192 The prohibition on trafficking in technologies for circumventing access con-
trols and use controls became effective in October 1998. Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 105, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2000)). The effective date of the prohibition on the act of cir-
cumventing access controls was delayed until October 2000 to allow the Librarian of
Congress time to engage in the first triennial rulemaking on exceptions from this
prohibition. See id., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2000).
193 See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267 (5th Cir. 1988).
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of section 1201, and it probably did not benefit from the anticir-
cumvention rules. DVD-Video was born in the pre-section-1201
era, but it has spent most of its life under section 1201 protection.
3. Ease of Circumvention
An ideal TPM would be impossible to circumvent. In reality,
any TPM can be circumvented; the only uncertainty is how much
the circumvention will cost.194 The less effective a TPM is in
preventing unauthorized use, the closer to the vertical axis the
recovered demand curve will tend to remain, resulting in a down-
ward shift of the marginal revenue curve and less-favorable con-
ditions for implementing the TPM.
The 1980s-era copy protections were easily circumvented.195
By contrast, the Windows XP and TurboTax activation and the
DIVX time limitation appear difficult to circumvent.
4. The Annoyance Factor
TPMs vary in the extent to which they interfere with a con-
sumer's use of the associated information good. Some TPMs are
intentionally more restrictive than others. Music files
downloaded from iTunes may be played on up to five com-
puters,1 96 while Adobe eBooks are tethered to two machines; 197
unlimited numbers of first-generation copies can be made from
DAT tapes, but DVDs cannot be copied at all.
TPMs may also interfere with usability in ways not intended by
the publisher. Most publishers probably would not mind if a cus-
tomer made a backup copy of an information good as long as it
was used for backup purposes only,198 yet anti-copy TPMs pro-
hibit copying altogether. A product activation technology that
194 Note that one element of the cost of circumvention is the expected cost of
legal liability, which a publisher can affect by adopting a more or less aggressive
policy of discovering and bringing lawsuits against those who engage in
circumvention.
195 See supra note 151.
196 See Apple, Share Easily. Stream Wirelessly., http://www.apple.com/itunes/
share.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
197 See Adobe, Frequently Asked Questions: eBook Users (Adobe Reader 6.0),
http://www.adobe.com/support/techdocs/329059.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005)
("You can view an eBook on one PC or Macintosh and on one PalmOS device.").
198 Contrary to this proposition is the opinion of former Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America head Jack Valenti, who reportedly said, "If you buy a DVD you
have a copy. If you want a backup copy you buy another one." Anick Jesdanun,
DVD-Duplication Software Maker to Modify Products, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Feb. 24, 2004, at 3C.
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requires the user to contact the publisher to reactivate the prod-
uct each time a new piece of software is installed on the user's
computer causes more non-productive usability problems than a
technology that requires reactivation only with significant
changes in hardware configuration.
An ideal TPM would also never malfunction. In the real
world, a TPM will sometimes interact unpredictably with the
equipment that is used to view or hear the information good. For
example, some copy-protected music CDs cannot be played in
the CD-ROM drives of certain computers.
The greater the annoyance factor that a TPM presents, the
more its use will increase the alienated demand and the more the
marginal revenue curve will shift downward. In addition, a
higher annoyance factor means that the publisher will incur
greater costs in providing technical support to its customers,
which will shift the marginal cost curve upward. Both of these
effects make it less likely that the publisher will implement the
TPM.
The 1980s-era copy-protection technologies generated many
consumer complaints about usability issues. In contrast, the Win-
dows XP and TurboTax activation technologies seem to create
usability problems for only the small segment of users who
change their hardware after activation, and DIVX created no
substantial reported usability problems.
5. Extent of Unauthorized Use
The outcome of the publisher's calculations will depend on the
extent of unauthorized use of the product in question. If there is
very little unauthorized use, then there can be very little demand
for the publisher to recover by implementing TPMs. Thus, the
less unauthorized use that occurs, the closer to the vertical axis
the recovered demand curve will be and the less benefit the pub-
lisher will experience from implementing TPMs.
The publishers of 1980s-era software, TurboTax, and Windows
XP all perceived high levels of unauthorized use of their prod-
ucts. In the case of DIVX, the only use that it prevented was
watching a movie on a rented DVD more than 48 hours after its
first viewing. It is unclear whether movie publishers considered
this an unauthorized use at all.
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6. The Salience Factor
If the implementation of a TPM achieves notoriety through
widespread publicity, more potential users will learn about it,
and alienated demand will increase. The TurboTax tethering
TPM was the focus of a great deal of negative publicity, due in
part to articles by Walter Mossberg and other journalists. The
TPMs discussed in the other case studies have achieved varying
degrees of salience.
7. The Third-Party Factor
TPMs vary in the extent to which their success depends on the
cooperation of third parties-that is, parties other than the entity
promoting the technology and the consumers who must decide
whether to buy implementations of it. The DIVX system was
highly dependent on cooperation by third parties. Circuit City
could unilaterally introduce the DIVX standard, but the technol-
ogy could not succeed in the marketplace unless consumer elec-
tronics companies cooperated by manufacturing DIVX-
compliant players, movie studios cooperated by releasing their
content on DIVX discs, and retailers (with which Circuit City
was in competition) cooperated by selling the DIVX players and
discs.
By contrast, the other TPMs considered in the case studies
were promoted by the publishers of the relevant information
goods, which prevented publishers from forming a nay-saying
third party. Copy protection schemes applied to software and
music CDs require no third-party cooperation because they work
on existing hardware. CSS required the codevelopment of com-
pliant hardware, but the movie studios avoided a roadblock here
by involving the consumer electronics and personal computer in-
dustries early in the process of developing the CSS standard. 199
C. Predictive Value of the Model
Can the empirical factors identified above serve to explain why
a publisher decided to implement or discontinue TPMs in a par-
ticular product? Can they predict whether a proposed TPM im-
199 See Trial Transcript at 476-80, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00 Civ. 277) (Testimony of Marsha King), avail-
able at http://www.eff.org/IPNideo/MPAA-DVDcases/?f=20000719_ny-trial-tran
script.html, affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001).
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plementation will succeed? If we tabulate these factors for each
of the case studies described above, we find that they offer mod-
est predictive value.
In the following Table 1, a "+" indicates a factor favoring im-
plementation of TPMs, a "-" represents the contrary, and a "?"
means the factor is neutral or uncertain. The entries for 1980s-
era software and Windows XP correspond to the historical expe-
rience, but the TurboTax entries do not seem to fit the expected
outcome. The entries for the other case studies are inconclusive.
The modesty of the model's predictive power is not surprising.
A publisher's decision concerning the implementation of TPMs
will inevitably be influenced by a variety of contextual factors not
closely related to the factors incorporated into the model. For
example, Intuit's decision to drop the tethering measure from
TurboTax may have owed something to Intuit's desire to main-
tain its reputation as a consumer-friendly enterprise, as suggested
by its publication of an open letter of apology and by the fact
that it dropped the TPM even though it apparently yielded signif-
icant short-term financial benefits.2"° In addition, there is no rea-
son to think that all of the factors should receive equal weight.
The circumstance that TurboTax had a strong rival in TaxCut,
and the fact that TaxCut's publisher sought to capitalize on In-
tuit's distress by luring its customers away with a campaign focus-
ing on the fact that TaxCut was TPM-free, might have been
enough to overwhelm all of the other factors. Finally, perform-
ance of the calculations needed to determine whether implemen-
tation of TPMs is in a publisher's interest is not a deterministic
exercise but involves a variety of estimates and downright
guesses about consumer behavior that may turn out to be
erroneous.
The model does, however, yield another set of predictions that
goes beyond what could be derived if we modeled TPMs as a
price increase. Several of the empirical factors described above
(and set out in Table 1) lie within the publisher's control to a
greater or lesser extent. A publisher can improve the benefits
that it receives from implementing TPMs by manipulating these
factors. Specifically, a publisher can (1) adopt TPMs that are less
subject to circumvention, (2) favor TPMs that create a minimum
200 See Baertlein, supra note 165, at C1 (reporting that TurboTax sales increased
by twenty-five percent over the previous year for the calendar quarter ending in
April 2003).
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of annoyance to authorized users, (3) use TPMs only in connec-
tion with products that are experiencing a relatively high degree
of unauthorized use, and (4) involve relevant third parties early
in the development process to prevent them from hindering the
successful deployment of the TPM. We may also anticipate that
TPM designers will strive to improve the technology by making
TPMs harder to circumvent and by reducing the annoyance
factor.
Microsoft seems to have been cognizant of the annoyance fac-
tor and the degree-of-unauthorized-use factor in deciding to re-
lease a corporate version of Windows XP that requires no
activation.20 1 Enterprises that make frequent hardware changes
to their computers will experience a higher level of annoyance
than home users because they are more likely to need to go
through the process of contacting Microsoft to reactivate the
software. Corporate users with a site license may be less likely
than home users to attempt to use a single copy of XP on more
than one computer.
CONCLUSION
The model developed in this Article reflects a recognition that
the dynamics of a publisher's decision whether to incorporate
TPMs in its products differ from those that apply when a typical
firm makes price or output decisions, despite the fact that the
firm's goal is profit maximization in both cases. Adding TPMs to
information goods cannot accurately be modeled as either a price
increase or an undesirable product characteristic. The proposed
model takes into account the special characteristics of TPMs, in-
cluding their ambiguous effect on demand and the fact that pub-
lishers incur implementation costs while making their products
less desirable to some consumers.
The model indicates that a publisher's calculations will be
highly influenced by consumer preferences. Those preferences
determine the shapes of the alienated demand and recovered de-
mand curves and can significantly affect the costs associated with
the implementation of a TPM.
The shapes of the relevant curves are also affected by a variety
of contextual facitors, which emerge from several case studies
involving implementation of TPMs. As in the context of price
201 See Yardena Arar, Product Activation Hacked, PC WORLD, Jan. 2002, at 19.
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and output decisions, market structure plays an important role,
but factors specific to the technology of TPMs are also highly
relevant.
The proposed model of publisher decision making, together
with the anecdotal evidence offered by the case studies, suggests
that profit-maximizing publishers that face competition have
meaningful incentives to be responsive to consumer TPM prefer-
ences. Publishers in markets that are monopolistic, monopolisti-
cally competitive, or oligopolistic face correspondingly less
pressure from such consumer preferences than do publishers in
competitive markets.
